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The Promissory Character of 
Adequate Assurances of Performance 
Michael J. Borden† 
INTRODUCTION 
The central questions of contract law and theory focus 
on the enforceability of promises.1 For the contract theorist, the 
question takes the form, why should the law enforce promises? 
For the lawyer, the question may often be, which promises will 
the law enforce? For parties to contracts, the salient question is 
often, what will happen if I (or my counterpart) fail to honor 
my promise? Implicit in each of these questions is both an ex 
ante and an ex post perspective: we care about whether certain 
utterances will be deemed worthy of the law’s attention, but we 
also care about how the law will respond to a broken promise.  
For the theorist, the ex ante and ex post questions are 
often intertwined, for one cannot satisfactorily articulate a 
rationale for enforcing promises without taking into account 
the consequences for the promisee if a promise were broken 
and the law provided no remedy. Students of contract law learn 
that the doctrinal bases of contractual obligation 
(consideration, promissory estoppel, unjust enrichment) 
correspond with the measures of damages (expectation, 
reliance, restitution).  
It is thus not surprising that so much scholarly 
attention is devoted to questions of enforceability and damages. 
Yet there is one doctrine in contract law that lies at the 
intersection of these two questions that has received very little 
attention in literature, and no attention whatsoever for its ex 
  
 † Associate Professor of Law, Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, Cleveland 
State University. This article benefitted from the input of the participants at the 
Fourth International Conference on Contract Law, the Central States Legal 
Scholarship Conference, and the Indiana University (Indianapolis) Law School Faculty 
Scholarship Colloquium. I also appreciate the excellent research assistance of Ashleigh 
Elscesser and the financial support of the Cleveland-Marshall Fund. 
 1 Melvin Aaron Eisenberg, The Responsive Model of Contract Law, 36 STAN. 
L. REV. 1107, 1112 (1984) (“The first great issue in contract law is what kinds of 
promises the law should enforce . . . .”). 
168 BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 76:1 
ante implications. The subject of this article is the doctrine of 
adequate assurances of performance. The doctrine is an 
innovation of twentieth-century contract law and functions as a 
mechanism to assist in sorting out the consequences of 
prospective non-performance.  
In contract law, a breach cannot occur until the time for 
performance has passed. But sometimes, it becomes obvious 
that one party is not going to perform. When that happens, the 
injured party often would like to pack it in and declare the 
contract at an end. But doing so poses risks. If the injured 
party jumps the gun and stops performing prematurely, he 
risks being deemed to have breached the contract himself. One 
way that contract law responds to this dilemma is through the 
doctrine of anticipatory repudiation. Under this doctrine, 
certain actions may constitute a present breach even before the 
time for performance has passed. A promisor commits a 
present breach by anticipatory repudiation when he either 
unequivocally expresses his intention not to perform his 
contractual obligations, or intentionally takes some action that 
renders such performance impossible. Anticipatory repudiation 
helps disappointed promisees to efficiently organize their 
affairs and find alternative arrangements, without having to 
wait until a performance deadline that may be fairly distant.  
But anticipatory repudiation can be a trap. An 
impatient promisee might misconstrue signals from an 
underperforming promisor as a repudiation when no legally 
cognizable repudiation has, in fact, occurred.2 In such a case, 
the injured promisor who thought he was entitled to move on 
from an impaired relationship may find himself liable for 
breach of contract. A well-counseled promisee who believes that 
his contractual partner will not perform, but who is not certain 
that he has received the requisite unequivocal statement of 
intention not to perform that constitutes an anticipatory 
repudiation, can pursue another avenue to extricate himself 
from a troubled contract.  
When adopted in 1961, Article 2 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code introduced to American contract law the 
doctrine of adequate assurances to address the problem of the 
  
 2 See McCloskey & Co. v. Minweld Steel Co., 220 F.2d 101 (3d Cir. 1955); 
Taylor v. Johnston, 539 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1975); E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 
§ 8.20, at 662-66 (4th ed. 2004).  
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insecure party.3 A promisee who has “reasonable grounds for 
insecurity” about the other party’s ability or willingness to 
perform “may demand in a record adequate assurance of due 
performance and until the party receives the assurance may if 
commercially reasonable suspend any performance for which 
he has not already received the agreed return.”4 Often, 
assurances are utterly straightforward, with the promisor 
merely affirming his intention to perform his contractual 
obligations. Sometimes, however, they involve new 
undertakings, such as a promise to furnish a personal guaranty 
or other measures to assuage the promisee’s insecurity. If the 
promisor does not promptly give the required assurances, he is 
deemed to have repudiated the contract, which means that the 
insecure party becomes entitled to stop performing. His 
remaining obligations are discharged and he can get on with 
his life. The purpose of the doctrine is thus to relieve the 
insecure party of the risk and uncertainty involved in relying 
on anticipatory repudiation as an avenue to a finding of breach. 
In effect, invoking the doctrine shifts the burden to the under-
performing promisor to affirm his intention to perform.  
What little has been written on the subject of adequate 
assurances has focused on analyzing its design and 
effectiveness as a little dance that contracting parties engage 
in on the road to a finding of breach or repudiation, or its 
effectiveness in helping the parties avoid such outcomes.5 
Similarly, the case law generated by the doctrine (some two 
hundred and fifty cases) has almost entirely centered on the 
fact-intensive issues of whether a promisee actually had 
reasonable grounds for insecurity, whether she had properly 
made her demand for assurances, or whether the assurances 
demanded were inappropriate.6 In contract law casebooks, the 
doctrine is invariably included in the materials on 
  
 3 See Zipporah Batshaw Wiseman, The Limits of Vision: Karl Llewellyn and 
the Merchant Rules, 100 HARV. L. REV. 465 (1987). 
 4 U.C.C. § 2-609(1) (revised 2003). 
 5 See, e.g., Richard Craswell, Insecurity, Repudiation, and Cure, 19 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 339 (1990); Larry T. Garvin, Adequate Assurance of Performance: Of Risk, 
Duress, and Cognition, 69 U. COLO. L. REV. 71 (1998); Robert A. Hillman, Keeping the 
Deal Together After Material Breach—Common Law Mitigation Rules, the UCC, and 
the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 47 U. COLO. L. REV. 553 (1976); Keith A. Rowley, 
A Brief History of Anticipatory Repudiation in American Contract Law, 69 U. CIN. L. 
REV. 565 (2001); Celia R. Taylor, Self-Help in Contract Law: An Exploration and 
Proposal, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 839 (1998); James J. White, Eight Cases and 
Section 251, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 841 (1982). 
 6 See infra notes 31-57 and accompanying text. 
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consequences of non-performance and remedies.7 To read all of 
the available primary and secondary source material on the 
doctrine, one would think that it relates solely, and not in a 
terribly important way, to the back-end component of the 
enforceability question that lies at the heart of contract law.  
But contract scholars have entirely missed the fact that 
the doctrine of adequate assurances implicates that most 
fundamental question of contract law: which promises are 
worthy of the law’s enforcement apparatus. In this article, I re-
characterize the doctrine as one with significant implications 
for the question of which promises the law should enforce. My 
aim is to focus readers’ attention on the promissory character 
of adequate assurances. By this I mean that I wish to 
investigate whether the undertakings contained in some of the 
more substantial assurances are properly to be considered 
promises with their own independent validity; that is, 
contracts. Contracts that can be sued on and give rise to 
damages apart from those that could be recovered under the 
parties’ original agreement. Contracts that stand alone and 
endure in force even after the original contract from which they 
arose has ceased to be in effect; or whether they should be 
conceived of as modifications of the original contract, or 
perhaps neither.  
Part I provides the reader with an account of the 
development of the doctrine of adequate assurances from its 
earliest roots in the doctrine of anticipatory repudiation. Part 
II explains the workings of the modern doctrine in the context 
of a recent case. In Part III, I argue that promises made in 
response to a demand for adequate assurances can be 
understood as a class of enforceable promises. In Parts IV and 
V, I attempt to work out the back-end consequences that would 
result from treating assurances as enforceable promises.8 
  
 7 See, e.g., RANDY E. BARNETT, CONTRACTS, CASES AND DOCTRINE 900-05 
(4th ed. 2008); CHARLES L. KNAPP, NATHAN M. CRYSTAL & HARRY G. PRINCE, 
PROBLEMS IN CONTRACT LAW 839-40 (6th ed. 2007); ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. 
HILLMAN, CONTRACT AND RELATED OBLIGATION 864-80 (4th ed. 2001). 
 8 This article is conceived as the first of a pair. Its focus is primarily 
doctrinal (arguing that adequate assurances can be understood as enforceable 
promises) and practical (considering the consequences of such an understanding). The 
follow-up article examines the theoretical implications raised by this article.  
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I. DOCTRINAL BACKGROUND 
The roots of the doctrine of adequate assurances lie in 
the legal and analytical quandary that confronts a party to a 
contract who awaits performance from an obligor who seems 
unlikely to perform.9 This dilemma arises from the fact that 
until the time for performance has passed, contract law, as a 
matter of both logic and doctrine, deems that no breach can 
occur, for the obligor might still perform his contractual 
obligations in a timely manner.10 If I hire a neighborhood 
teenager to mow my lawn on Saturday, he has until Saturday 
to perform. If he tells me on Thursday evening that his friend 
is about to leave for the beach for the weekend and he is 
thinking about joining him, he has not breached. He can only 
breach by failing to mow my lawn on Saturday.  
So what am I to do? I need my lawn trimmed on 
Saturday. If I do not arrange for a substitute mower soon, I 
may be stuck with an ill-kempt lawn for my garden party. 
Common sense would suggest that as soon as I see my young 
friend load his beach bag into his friend’s car, I should call 
another enterprising local youth and arrange to have her come 
and cut the grass. But if I do so, and the original obligor feels 
the pangs of conscience and returns to honor his contract, I will 
be obligated to pay both the replacement and the prodigal. If I 
refuse to perform my part of the original contract, the law will 
hold me liable for breach of contract. Thus, an obligee who 
encounters a contracting partner who appears unwilling to 
perform faces a significant legal risk that impedes his ability to 
efficiently plan his affairs. This problem is not new, nor is the 
legal doctrine that purports to address it. 
A similar dilemma faced the plaintiff in Hochster v. De 
la Tour,11 the English case that is widely considered to have 
established the modern law of anticipatory repudiation.12 In 
April 1852, Hochster and De la Tour entered into a contract 
  
 9 Garvin, supra note 5, at 71-76. 
 10 See generally Alan G. Dowling, A Right to Adequate Assurance of 
Performance in All Transactions: U.C.C. § 2-609 Beyond Sales of Goods, 48 S. CAL. L. 
REV. 1358, 1358-59 (1975). 
 11 (1853) 118 Eng. Rep. 922 (Q.B.); 2 El. & Bl. 678. 
 12 In his excellent article tracing the origins of the law of anticipatory 
repudiation, Keith Rowley explains that the common wisdom that treats Hochster as 
the fountainhead of anticipatory repudiation is mistaken. He discusses several cases in 
America and England that predate Hochster in recognizing the right to sue for breach 
before the time for performance. To trace the earliest roots of anticipatory repudiation, 
see Rowley, supra note 5, at 571-600. 
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whereby De la Tour would employ Hochster as a courier for 
three months, beginning on June 1, 1852 at a rate of 10 pounds 
per month.13 On May 11, 1852, De la Tour informed Hochster 
that he had made other arrangements and would not be 
honoring the contract.14 Hochster sued De la Tour on May 22, 
1852.15 He argued that De la Tour’s renunciation of his promise 
constituted a breach of the contract, even though the time for 
performance had not yet arrived.16 De la Tour’s answer, 
naturally, was that there could be no breach before the first of 
June.17 After the jury found for Hochster, De la Tour moved to 
arrest the judgment.18 
De la Tour argued that to prevail in his suit, Hochster 
would have to stand “ready and willing” to perform the entire 
contract to its conclusion.19 He insisted that by finding other 
similar employment, Hochster had forfeited his right to sue on 
the contract.20 While this argument may sound almost silly to 
the modern ear, it was fully consonant with the legal 
environment of the day. Consider Justice Holmes’ roughly 
contemporaneous observation that “the degree of [the 
promisor’s] ability at any moment before he was called on to 
pay [is] no concern of the [promisee].”21 
The Lord Chief Justice disagreed with the defendant, 
and in so doing, he initiated a major change in Anglo-American 
law: 
If the plaintiff has no remedy for breach of the contract unless he 
treats the contract as in force, and acts upon it down to the 1st June 
1852, it follows that, till then, he must enter into no employment 
which will interfere with his promise “to start with the defendant on 
such travels on the day and year,” and that he must then be properly 
equipped in all respects as a courier for a three months’ tour on the 
continent of Europe. But it is surely much more rational, and more 
for the benefit of both parties, that, after renunciation of the 
agreement by the defendant, the plaintiff should be at liberty to 
consider himself absolved from any future performance of it, 
retaining his right to sue for any damage he has suffered from the 
breach of it. Thus, instead of remaining idle and laying out money in 
  
 13 Hochster, 118 Eng. Rep. at 922. 
 14 See id. at 924. 
 15 See id. 
 16 See id.  
 17 Id. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Id. at 926-27. 
 21 Lowe v. Harwood, 29 N.E. 538, 539 (Mass. 1885). 
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preparations which must be useless, he is at liberty to seek service 
under another employer, which would go in mitigation of the 
damages to which he would otherwise be entitled for a breach of 
contract.22  
As for Hochster’s right to an immediate remedy, the 
court noted that 
The man who wrongfully renounces a contract into which he has 
deliberately entered cannot justly complain if he is immediately sued 
. . . by the man whom he has injured: and it seems reasonable to 
allow an option to the injured party, either to sue immediately, or to 
wait till the time when the act was to be done, still holding it as 
prospectively binding for the exercise of this option, which may be 
advantageous to the innocent party, and cannot be prejudicial to the 
wrongdoer.23 
Today’s lawyers and law students are well aware of the 
modern legal response to this problem: anticipatory 
repudiation. According to the Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts, “[w]here an obligor repudiates a duty before he has 
committed a breach by non-performance and before he has 
received all of the agreed exchange for it, his repudiation alone 
gives rise to a claim for damages for total breach.”24 This terse 
provision neatly summarizes the current doctrine that aims to 
resolve my conflict with my derelict neighbor. 
But my problem has not completely gone away. For 
another provision of the Restatement explains what counts as a 
repudiation.  
A repudiation is  
(a) a statement by the obligor to the obligee indicating that the 
obligor will commit a breach that would of itself give the obligee a 
claim for damages for total breach under §243 or  
(b) a voluntary affirmative act which renders the obligor unable or 
apparently unable to perform without such breach.25 
The cases applying the doctrine of anticipatory 
repudiation have consistently held that an obligor must 
manifest an unambiguous intention “not to perform except on 
conditions which go beyond the contract” before he will be 
  
 22 Hochster, 118 Eng. Rep. at 926. 
 23 Id. 
 24 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 253(1) (1981). 
 25 Id. § 250. 
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deemed to have repudiated.26 So where does that leave me on 
Thursday evening? The teenager has only told me that he is 
thinking about going to the beach. He has not said when he 
will return. He has not said that he will not perform. Perhaps 
his words and actions have amounted to a repudiation; perhaps 
not. Thus the law of repudiation has addressed one problem 
and introduced another. By inviting the obligee to treat a 
repudiation as a present breach, the doctrine has replaced a 
regime that, for all its flaws, at least provided a form of 
certainty (no breach can occur before the time for performance 
has passed) with a doctrine that simply shifts the locus of legal 
risk to the calculation of whether or not the obligor has indeed 
committed a repudiation. If the obligee is found to have been 
mistaken about the repudiation, he will likely have committed 
a breach himself. 
So again, where does all this leave me on Thursday 
evening? According to Karl Llewellyn, it leaves me feeling 
insecure. Llewellyn recognized that the doctrine of anticipatory 
repudiation was unsatisfactory in the way we have just 
described. He was sensitive to the commercial concerns of the 
promisee who doubts the willingness or ability of the promisor 
to perform, but who cannot avail himself of the remedy of 
present breach by anticipatory repudiation, or at least has 
concerns about his ability to resort to that doctrine.  
In 1941, when Llewellyn led the National Conference of 
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in its endeavor to craft 
what became Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, he 
included in his first draft a provision that proved to be contract 
law’s first recognition of the concept of insecurity.27 This first 
tentative step was a provision that stated that a buyer on 
credit warrants to its seller that it “will give the seller no 
reasonable grounds for insecurity in regard to his continuing 
ability and willingness to perform.”28 Effectively, this iteration 
of the concept of insecurity would have created an implied term 
that could be sued upon if breached. But this initial, limited 
  
 26 Id. § 250 cmt. 3 (citing U.C.C. § 2-610 cmt. 2 (revised 2003)). 
 27 See AN ACT RELATING TO SALES OF PERSONAL PROPERTY AND TO 
CONTRACTS FOR THE SALE THEREOF, AND TO RIGHTS, OBLIGATIONS, AND REMEDIES 
ARISING OUT OF SUCH SALES OR CONTRACTS AND IN CONNECTION WITH FINANCING OR 
OTHER TRANSACTIONS COMMONLY ASSOCIATED THEREWITH, AND TO MAKE UNIFORM 
THE LAW OF SUCH MATTERS § 16-C (1941), reprinted in 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS 3 (Elizabeth Slusser Kelly & Ann Puckett eds., 1995).  
 28 Id. at 73. 
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provision grew into a much more complete remedy for a party 
who senses an impending breach. 
When Article 2 was finally completed, it included 
section 2-609, titled “Right to Adequate Assurance of 
Performance.” Official Comment 1 eloquently states the 
rationale for and purpose of the doctrine. 
The section rests on the recognition of the fact that the essential 
purpose of a contract between commercial men is actual performance 
and they do not bargain merely for a promise, or for a promise plus 
the right to win a lawsuit and that a continuing sense of reliance and 
security that the promised performance will be forthcoming when 
due, is an important feature of the bargain. If either the willingness 
or the ability of a party to perform declines materially between the 
time of contracting and the time for performance, the other party is 
threatened with the loss of a substantial part of what he has 
bargained for. A seller needs protection not merely against having to 
deliver on credit to a shaky buyer, but also against having to procure 
and manufacture the goods, perhaps turning down other customers. 
Once he has been given reason to believe that the buyer’s 
performance has become uncertain, it is an undue hardship to force 
him to continue his own performance. Similarly, a buyer who 
believes that the seller’s deliveries have become uncertain cannot 
safely wait for the due date of performance when he has been buying 
to assure himself of materials for his current manufacturing or to 
replenish his stock of merchandise.29 
With this full-throated defense of his innovative scheme to 
protect the insecure party, Llewellyn presented to the 
American legal community a tool that has proved useful in 
managing the risks that often arise when a party appears 
unlikely to perform. Let us consider the text of the provision. 
Subsection one states, 
A contract for sale imposes an obligation on each party that the 
other’s expectation of receiving due performance will not be 
impaired. If reasonable grounds for insecurity arise with respect to 
the performance of either party, the other may demand in a record 
adequate assurance of due performance and until he receives the 
assurance may if commercially reasonable suspend any performance 
for which it has not already received the agreed return.30 
The provision comprises several legally significant 
components. First, one must establish reasonable grounds for 
insecurity.31 Second, if such grounds exist, the Code requires 
  
 29 U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 1 (revised 2003). 
 30 Id. § 2-609(1). 
 31 Id. 
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that a demand for assurances be made in writing.32 Third, the 
assurances must be adequate.33 Fourth, the insecure party may 
suspend his performance for a commercially reasonable time 
until he receives the assurances.34 Finally, if the recipient of the 
demand does not provide the assurances within a reasonable 
time, the insecure party is entitled to treat this intransigence 
as a repudiation.35 
Clearly, each of these elements introduces significant 
levels of factual and legal uncertainty. What counts as 
reasonable grounds for insecurity?36 What assurances are 
adequate?37 How is one to formulate a demand so as to put the 
promisor on notice of his potential liability under section 2-
609?38 What counts as a reasonable time for the promisee to 
wait to receive assurances?39 The Code’s minimally helpful 
response is to inform us that “the reasonableness of grounds for 
insecurity and the adequacy of any assurance offered shall be 
determined according to commercial standards.”40 
The Official Comments attempt to furnish a somewhat 
more textured method for evaluating some of the factual issues 
that arise when an insecure party invokes section 2-609. For 
example, “a report from an apparently trustworthy source that 
the seller had shipped defective goods or was planning to ship 
them would normally give the buyer reasonable grounds for 
  
 32 Id. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Id. 
 36 See Smyers v. Quartz Works Corp., 880 F. Supp. 1425 (D. Kan. 1995) 
(failure to respond to attempts to communicate); Creusot-Loire Int’l, Inc. v. Coppus 
Eng’g Corp., 585 F. Supp. 45 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (reliable information from others who 
contract with the promisor that the promisor’s goods are defective). 
 37 See Smyers, 880 F. Supp. 1425; Creusot-Loire, 585 F. Supp. 45 (demand for 
letter of credit and extension of warranty upheld as adequate and not excessive). 
 38 The language of section 2-609 requires that the demand be in writing, 
though many courts have relaxed this requirement. In fact, the courts have often been 
extremely flexible about the required form of the demand. See infra Part III. Somewhat 
surprisingly, several courts have found that demand has been made and assurances 
given where the parties themselves did not realize that they had done so. See Am. 
Research Bureau, Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc., 663 F.2d 189, 196 n.19 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 
AMF, Inc. v. McDonald’s Corp., 536 F.2d 1167, 1171 (7th Cir. 1976); James J. White, 
Eight Cases and Section 251, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 841-42 (1982) (discussing cases 
in which assurances were upheld despite the lack of a formal written demand). But see 
Cont’l Grain Co. v. McFarland, 29 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 512 (4th Cir. 1980) (demand for 
assurances must be in writing). 
 39 The courts do not appear eager to either extend the thirty-day limit 
suggested by the code or require promisors to comply with a demand more promptly 
than within thirty days. See, e.g., Smyers, 880 F. Supp. at 1432-33. 
 40 U.C.C. § 2-609(2) (revised 2003). 
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insecurity.”41 This bit of guidance is tepid, but mainly 
inoffensive. The Comments’ advice for assessing the adequacy 
of the assurance, however, verges on risible:  
Where the buyer can make use of a defective delivery, a mere 
promise by a seller of good repute that he is giving the matter his 
attention and that the defect will not be repeated, is normally 
sufficient. Under the same circumstances, however, a similar 
statement by a known corner-cutter might well be considered 
insufficient without the posting of a guaranty or, if so demanded by 
the buyer, a speedy replacement of the delivery involved.42 
The attempt to distinguish between reputable actors 
and known corner-cutters may perhaps appeal to common 
sense, and it may comport with Llewellyn’s overall mission of 
crafting a law that rings true for “commercial men,”43 yet this 
suggestion could not escape the gentle derision of the drafters 
of the New York State Law Revision Commission Report on the 
UCC.44 The Report noted that “it is doubtful whether courts 
would be receptive to an offer of evidence that the opposite 
party was a ‘known corner-cutter’ in view of the danger that 
this issue might lead to a major digression, with the dangers of 
prejudice presented by an exchange of name-calling.”45 
The picture that emerges from all of this is of a well-
conceived doctrine that addresses a significant problem in a 
logical way, but one that is likely to raise challenging factual 
issues in litigation, undercutting its effectiveness as a measure 
to create certainty and predictability in commercial affairs. In 
fact, a large majority of the reported cases on adequate 
assurances deal with the issue of whether the promisee in fact 
had reasonable grounds for insecurity.46  
  
 41 Id. § 2-609 cmt. 3. 
 42 Id. § 2-609 cmt. 4. 
 43 See Franklin G. Snyder, Clouds of Mystery: Dispelling the Realist Rhetoric 
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 68 OHIO ST. L. REV. 11, 11 (2007). 
 44 STATE OF N.Y. LAW REVISION COMM’N, STUDY OF UNIFORM COMMERCIAL 
CODE NO. 65, at 538 (1955). 
 45 Id.  
 46 Danzig v. AEC Corp., 224 F.3d 1333, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (promisor 
missing deadlines created grounds for insecurity); Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. 
Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 572, 581 (7th Cir. 1976) (reasonable grounds 
for insecurity must be based on events occurring after contract negotiations; subjective 
fear that obligee will not perform held insufficient); Nat’l Ropes, Inc. v. Nat’l Diving 
Serv., Inc., 513 F.2d 53, 61 (5th Cir. 1975) (no reasonable grounds for insecurity); La. 
Power & Light Co. v. Allegheny Ludlum Indus., 517 F. Supp. 1319, 1322-23 (E.D. La. 
1981) (reasonable grounds for insecurity where seller suggested a disinclination to 
perform because of rising costs); Copylease Corp. of Am. v. Memorex Corp., 403 F. 
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A much smaller group of cases concerns whether the 
assurances demanded were adequate or excessive,47 and several 
cases address the form of the demand.48 Courts may deny relief 
to insecure promisees who have demanded assurances that 
exceeded what the court found to be adequate. In Scott v. 
Crown, the parties had entered into several contracts for the 
purchase and sale of wheat.49 In the course of discussions with 
its banker, Scott learned that Crown “was not the best grain 
trader” and was advised to look into Crown’s reputation.50 An 
agent from the Department of Agriculture informed Scott that 
other farmers had complained about Crown’s failure to pay 
them.51 Scott acted on this information by demanding 
assurances from Crown in the form of immediate payment of 
all amounts due (the contracts called for payment within 30 
days of delivery).52 The Colorado Court of Appeals ruled that 
Scott did not, as a matter of law, have the right to suspend its 
performance after demanding assurances, because he had 
“demanded performance beyond that required by the 
contract.”53 
Although only one other court has agreed with the Scott 
court in condemning assurances that go beyond the original 
undertakings of the contract,54 the ruling highlights an 
interesting doctrinal conflict inherent in the process of 
demanding assurances. However, in their treatise on the 
Uniform Commercial Code, White and Summers assert that 
the approach the Scott court took is incorrect. As they explain, 
“[a]ll demands for adequate assurance call for more than was 
originally promised under the contract, and that is precisely 
  
Supp. 625, 630-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (promisor’s statement that contract was not binding 
created reasonable grounds for insecurity). 
 47 See Scott v. Crown, 765 P.2d 1043, 1046-47 (Colo. App. 1988); Pittsburgh-
Des Moines Steel Co., 532 F.2d at 572. 
 48 Nat’l Ropes, 513 F.2d at 60-61 n.9; Auto. Energy Sys., Inc. v. Fibers & 
Fabrics of Ga., Inc., 298 S.E.2d 328, 329-30 (Ga. Ct. App. 1982); Bodine Sewer v. E. Ill. 
Precast, Inc., 493 N.E.2d 705, 712 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986); Teeman v. Jurek, 251 N.W.2d 698, 
701 (Minn. 1977). However, in some cases an oral demand for assurances has sufficed. 
See Am. Research Bureau, Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc. 663 F.2d 189, 195-96 (D.C. Cir. 1980); 
Diskmakers, Inc. v. DeWitt Equip. Corp., 555 F.2d 1177, 1180 (3d Cir. 1977). 
 49 Scott, 765 P.2d at 1044-45. 
 50 Id. at 1045. 
 51 Id.  
 52 Id.  
 53 Id. at 1046-47.  
 54 Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co. v. Brookhaven Manor Water Co., 532 F.2d 
572, 581 (7th Cir. 1976) (demand was excessive because it sought more than what was 
originally promised under the contract).  
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what 2-609 authorizes.”55 Yet one of the definitions of 
anticipatory repudiation is a manifestation of unwillingness to 
continue to perform except upon conditions that go beyond the 
terms of the contract.56 Despite what is probably a doctrinal 
error on the part of the Scott court, if an insecure party 
demands excessive assurances, he exposes himself to some risk 
of committing a repudiation. 
When one considers that the bulk of adequate assurance 
cases involve disputes over whether a promisee actually had 
adequate grounds for insecurity, and that the promisee not 
infrequently loses the case on this ground,57 a somewhat 
unflattering picture of the doctrine emerges. Recall the original 
problem of the promisee who foresees a breach by the promisor: 
before the middle of the 19th Century, he had no recourse but to 
wait until the time for performance passed. With the advent of 
anticipatory repudiation, he could treat certain behavior as a 
breach, but he risked being deemed the breacher if he guessed 
wrong about the law’s eventual interpretation of the promisor’s 
actions. Llewellyn’s innovation purported to provide a 
procedure to benefit the promisee who did not believe that the 
promisor had actually repudiated, but who nonetheless 
suffered economically as a result of insecurity.  
But if the pre-Article 2 promisee had to cope with risk 
and insecurity as a result of his imperfect capacity to 
accurately spot a repudiation, the promisee who relies on 
section 2-609 must cope with an analogous problem, but at a 
slightly different moment. He does not lay his wager upon the 
existence of a repudiation, but rather on the reasonableness of 
his grounds for insecurity. As one commentator put it in 
assessing section 2-609’s effectiveness as a legal innovation, 
“section 2-609 sometimes does little more than extend the 
minuet between the weaseling party and the contractual 
counterpart and add a couple of new moves.”58 
Nevertheless, the doctrine has been viewed as enough of 
a success that only two decades after the widespread 
  
 55 JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 6-2, 
at 199 (5th ed. 2000). 
 56 See U.C.C. § 2-610 cmt. 2 (revised 2003); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 250 cmt. b (1981). 
 57 See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 58 WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 55, at 197. 
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enactment of Article 2 in state legislatures, the American Law 
Institute included it in the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.59  
 The Restatement’s version of the doctrine is nearly 
identical to section 2-609. One small difference is that the 
Restatement does not require the demand to be made in 
writing. Section 2-609, on its face, requires a writing, but many 
courts have disregarded that requirement.60 Another minor 
difference is that where the Uniform Commercial Code defines 
both the reasonableness of the grounds for insecurity and the 
adequacy of the assurances demanded by commercial 
standards, the Restatement does not.61  
Having established the general legal outline of the 
doctrine, let us now place the law into a factual context. 
Sometimes, assurances take a relatively simple form—a mere 
affirmation of one’s duties, a promise to actually perform the 
obligations undertaken in the contract.62 But sometimes, the 
assurances consist of new undertakings. These can take the 
form of granting the insecure party the right to inspect the 
books of the underperforming party in order to confirm ongoing 
solvency.63 Credit terms could be altered to reduce the amount a 
buyer may borrow or shorten his time for repayment.64 Or, more 
drastically, the insecure party might demand a personal 
guaranty from a third party.65 But case law also reveals some 
more interesting assurances. A buyer who is behind in 
  
 59 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 251 (1981). 
(1) Where reasonable grounds arise to believe that the obligor will commit a 
breach by non-performance that would of itself give the obligee a claim for 
damages for total breach under §243, the obligee may demand adequate 
assurances of due performance and may, if reasonable, suspend any 
performance for which he has not already received the agreed exchange until 
he receives such assurance. 
(2) The obligee may treat as a repudiation the obligor’s failure to provide 
within a reasonable time such assurance of due performance as is adequate 
in the circumstances of the particular case.  
Id. But this is not to say that the doctrine has escaped serious critique. For an incisive 
critique, see Garvin, supra note 5, at 129-40.  
 60 See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text. 
 61 There are a few other differences between the two versions of the doctrine, 
none of which are significant for our purposes. For an exegesis of the differences, see 
Taylor, supra note 5, at 889-93. 
 62 U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 4 (revised 2003); see also, e.g., La. Power & Light Co. v. 
Allegheny Ludlum Indus., Inc., 517 F. Supp. 1319, 1322-23 (E.D. La. 1981). 
 63 Int’l Therapeutics, Inc. v. McGraw-Edison Co., 721 F.2d 488, 492 (5th Cir. 1983). 
 64 Hornell Brewing Co. v. Spry, 664 N.Y.S.2d 698, 700-01, 703 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997). 
 65 Creusot-Loire Int’l, Inc. v. Coppus Eng’g Corp., 585 F. Supp. 45, 50 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983). 
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payments might assign his receivables to the seller.66 A buyer 
who is concerned about the quality of the machinery he is 
purchasing might ask for an extension or enlargement of his 
warranty.67 We could make up some other examples; a seller of 
special equipment might make alternative arrangements for 
the procurement of higher quality components where the goods 
have been defective. But let us take a close look at an actual 
recent case in which a promisor provides an assurance that 
involves a new undertaking, and we will find that there may be 
more to the doctrine than has yet been considered by any court 
or theorist.  
II. THE MODERN DOCTRINE 
Hornell v. Spry68 appears to be a run of the mill 
adequate assurances case, addressing most of the familiar 
issues. But a careful reading of the facts reveals an issue that 
was not litigated, but that directs our attention to the 
promissory character of adequate assurances. Hornell was a 
supplier of beverages, including Arizona Iced Tea.69 It entered 
into a contract with Steven Spry whereby Spry was to be an 
exclusive dealer of Arizona Iced Tea products in Canada.70 
Perhaps because Spry had a reputation as a successful 
businessman, Hornell was prepared to ship him a large 
quantity of product on credit without a written agreement.71 
The relationship quickly ran into significant problems, mostly 
stemming from the fact that Spry was not paying for the 
beverages Hornell was shipping.72 After a series of attempts to 
resolve their differences, the parties agreed to a new, more 
rigorous financing arrangement, whereby Hornell would 
“provide Spry with a $300,000 line of credit, so long as 
payments were made on a net 14 day basis.”73 Spry also entered 
into an agreement with a factor, whereby Spry would assign 
his receivables to the factor who would, in turn, pay Hornell 
  
 66 Erwin Weller Co. v. Talon, Inc., 295 N.W.2d 172 (S.D. 1980); Hornell, 664 
N.Y.S.2d at 698. 
 67 Creusot-Loire, 585 F. Supp. 45. 
 68 Hornell, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 698. 
 69 Id. at 699. 
 70 Id. 
 71 Id. at 699-700. 
 72 Id. at 700. 
 73 Id. 
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the amounts due on Spry’s account.74 Hornell resumed shipping 
iced tea to Spry on these terms, but despite the fact that Spry 
made his first payment on time, Hornell learned that “Spry’s 
warehouse was empty, that he had no managerial, sales or 
office staff, that he had no trucks, and that in effect his whole 
operation was a sham.”75  
As a result of this disturbing news, on May 10, 1994, 
Hornell wrote a letter to Spry stating,  
[B]efore we release any more product, we are asking you to provide 
us with a letter confirming the existence of your line of credit as well 
as a personal guarantee that is backed up with a personal financial 
statement that can be verified. Another option would be for you to 
provide us with an irrevocable letter of credit in the amount of 
$300,000.76  
Spry did not respond to this letter and, after a few months of 
negotiations, Hornell sued Spry, seeking a declaratory 
judgment that Spry had no further rights under the contract.77 
In ruling for Hornell, the court noted that while both parties 
maintained that there had been only one demand for adequate 
assurances (the alteration of credit terms to cap advances at 
$300,000 and demand that payment be made in full within 
fourteen days), in fact Hornell had made two separate demands 
for adequate assurances.78  
The court agreed that Spry’s initial failure to make 
timely payments gave Hornell reasonable grounds for 
insecurity and ruled that Hornell’s initiation of tighter credit 
terms was a reasonable demand for assurances.79 These 
assurances were given and put the relationship on proper legal 
footing.80 But the court explained that when Hornell learned 
that Spry had been accepting shipments of product without 
having established any appropriate business operations, 
Hornell had renewed grounds for insecurity.81 Thus, the May 10 
letter constituted another appropriate demand for adequate 
assurances.82 Spry’s failure to respond to this demand 
  
 74 Id. at 700. Neither of these new commitments was made pursuant to a 
formal written demand for assurances under section 2-609. Id. at 700, 702. 
 75 Id. at 701. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 699, 701. 
 78 Id. at 701-03. 
 79 Id. at 703. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 703-04.  
 82 Id. 
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amounted to a “repudiation of the distributorship agreement, 
which entitled plaintiff to suspend performance and terminate 
the agreement.”83 
Putting aside the question of what Spry wanted with all 
that iced tea if he wasn’t going to sell it, the case raises a series 
of issues common to the adequate assurances cases. Did the 
first attempt to restrain Spry’s actions with the imposition of 
tighter credit terms amount to a demand for assurances? Were 
Hornell’s second grounds for insecurity reasonable in view of 
the fact that Spry had paid his balance in full within fourteen 
days, in accordance with the initial demand for assurances? 
Were the assurances demanded in the May 10 letter excessive?  
None of these questions caused much difficulty for the 
Hornell court, though it did hint that there was some doubt as 
to whether Hornell’s second demand was excessive.84 Yet there 
is another question lurking in this case, a question that courts 
have yet to address. When Hornell initially found that Spry 
was delinquent in its payments, it demanded that Spry agree 
to new credit terms in order to assuage its insecurity.85 In 
giving these assurances, Spry made a promise. The question 
that neither the Hornell court, nor any other court, seems to 
have explicitly confronted is, how long should this new 
arrangement endure? Is it to last the lifetime of the contract? 
Should it persist only until Spry establishes a record of timely 
payment? Or should Spry be required to comply with the 
promise of the assurances until Hornell has been made whole? 
The first option suggests that the assurances amount to a 
modification of the contract. The second, which is probably 
what the Hornell court would have chosen, would more closely 
tie the assurance to the insecurity—when the promisee is no 
longer insecure, the assurance is no longer needed.86 The last 
option would indicate that the assurance represents an 
independent promise in the nature of a separate contract.  
Reflecting upon these questions forces one to consider 
the promissory character of adequate assurances. What are we 
to make of this promise? Is it a modification of the original 
  
 83 Id. at 704. 
 84 Id. (noting that the question of reasonableness of demands for assurances 
was “a close one”).  
 85 Id. at 700. 
 86 See infra note 153 and accompanying text. 
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contract or could it be viewed as an independent promise?87 
This article will focus on the latter possibility. When one 
focuses on the promissory character of the assurance in this 
manner, one must confront several questions. Is the promise 
enforceable as a contract?88 How long is it to endure?89 What are 
the consequences if it is breached, and can its breach give rise 
to damages independent of the original contract?90 This last 
question takes on particular importance when one considers 
the possibility that the original contract might include some 
limitations on damages, such as a stipulated damages clause, 
an exclusion of consequential damages, or a clause limiting 
damages to repair or replacement. The remainder of this article 
will address these questions. 
III. ADEQUATE ASSURANCES OFTEN COMPRISE PROMISES 
THAT SHOULD BE TREATED AS CONTRACTS 
This section will, from a doctrinal perspective, examine 
whether promises made in response to a demand for adequate 
assurances meet the basic requirements of a contract. 
Specifically, this Part will consider contract law’s traditional 
bases of enforcement as well as a relevant ground to deny 
enforcement—duress. 
A. Enforceable Promises 
A logical place to begin this inquiry is with the 
definition of a contract. A contract is unhelpfully defined in the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts as “a promise or set of 
promises for the breach of which the law gives a remedy.”91 Of 
course, not all promises are enforced as contracts; the simplest 
way to describe the current state of American contract law is to 
say that there are two primary categories of promises that 
courts enforce: those that are given for consideration, and those 
on which the promisee detrimentally relies.92 In this article, I 
  
 87 Here I wish to clarify my terminology. By using the term “independent 
promise,” I do not wish to reference the vocabulary of conditions. Rather, I simply 
mean that the promise of the assurance could form the basis of a separate contract. 
 88 See infra Part III.  
 89 See infra Part IV. 
 90 See infra Part V. 
 91 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 1 (1981).  
 92 There are, of course, other categories of enforceable promises. For example, 
promises under seal and promises to modify a contract under section 2-209 of the 
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will ask whether various types of assurances satisfy one or the 
other of these two criteria for enforceability, but I will treat an 
affirmative answer to that question as a necessary—but not a 
sufficient—condition for treating such an assurance as a 
contract. Even if an assurance-promise is enforceable because 
it is given for consideration, or is relied on, it may only be 
enforceable as a modification of the original contract, not as a 
separate contract.93 
As a preliminary matter, let us first dispose of the 
weakest form of assurance contemplated by section 2-609: the 
mere affirmation of one’s intention to perform his obligations 
under the contract.94 While this sort of assurance could possibly 
be construed as a promise, it is not the sort of promise that this 
article seeks to address.95 Instead, as we embark on our inquiry 
into whether an assurance might involve an enforceable 
promise, we will focus on more robust, sturdy promises, such as 
the one to furnish a personal guaranty. 
Is such an assurance an enforceable promise? On one 
level, the question of enforcement can be answered 
preliminarily in a rather straightforward manner: yes, it’s 
enforceable. Why? By operation of positive law—section 2-609. 
But this facile answer skirts a fundamental underlying 
question: what does it mean to enforce a promise? Typically, 
contract law enforces promises by providing a remedy for their 
breach, and the remedy is typically money damages meant to 
put the promisee in the position he would have occupied had 
the promisor performed.96 But in saying that section 2-609 
makes the promise enforceable, we are only saying that section 
2-609 provides its own regime of enforcement. The promise is, 
by the terms of the statutory provision, enforced with the 
remedy of accelerating breach, i.e., the insecure party may 
treat the principal contract as repudiated. Yet this proposition 
is, in fact, inaccurate. Section 2-609 is silent on enforcement of 
the promise, and merely creates a duty to make a certain kind 
  
Uniform Commercial Code. U.C.C. § 2-209 (revised 2003); JOSEPH M. PERILLO & JOHN 
D. CALAMARI, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 274-78 (5th ed. 2003). 
 93 I will take up this line of inquiry in the epilogue, infra. 
 94 Assurances of this sort are rather common in the case law. See, e.g., 
Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Bressler, 977 F.2d 720 (2d Cir. 1992); Gutor Int’l AG v. 
Raymond Packer Co., 493 F.2d 938 (1st Cir. 1992). 
 95 This is not to say that this sort of assurance is entirely devoid of theoretical 
significance. Those who would take a strong position on the illegitimacy of assurances 
would even consider the mere affirmation of intention to perform to be more security 
than that to which the promisee is entitled. See Garvin, supra note 5, at 130-38. 
 96 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(1) (1981). 
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of promise and punishes the failure to make that promise, 
under certain circumstances. Further, it is silent on the 
question of what happens when a party furnishes assurances 
but does not live up to them.97 Thus my central question: is the 
promise enforceable in its own right, outside of the context and 
framework of section 2-609?  
The promise might be enforceable for the same kinds of 
reasons we enforce other promises; namely, it might have been 
given for consideration, or detrimentally relied upon by the 
promisee. Let us begin by asking whether there is 
consideration for the promise. According to Holmes, 
consideration involves not just a benefit to the promisor and a 
detriment to the promisee, but also a relationship of “reciprocal 
conventional inducement.”98 The “promise must induce the 
detriment and the detriment must induce the promise.”99 In our 
example, the buyer promised to furnish a personal guaranty of 
monies owed. Was that promise bargained for? Did the buyer 
receive a benefit, or did the seller suffer a detriment? In order 
to answer these questions, a bit of factual context will be 
helpful. Imagine the following conversation between a seller 
and a buyer: 
S: Look, I’ve heard that you have not been paying your other 
creditors for quite some time. Even though you have finally paid 
your balance, many of your recent payments have been late. I’m very 
concerned. 
B: I know. Cash has been a little tight, but things have already 
picked up since the beginning of the new quarter. I’m pretty sure 
that by the end of the year, I’ll be back to paying off my full balance 
early, as I have done in years past. 
S: I don’t think that’s going to cut it. I’ve got plenty of other 
customers I can sell to. I don’t want to stop doing business with you, 
but without a personal guaranty, I’ve got no other choice. 
  
 97 One case has hinted at an answer to this question. See Am. Research 
Bureau, Inc. v. E-Systems, Inc., 663 F.2d 189, 196 n.10 (D.C. Cir. 1980). Professor 
White has pointed out that a careful reading of a footnote in ARB reveals the court’s 
belief that “it was the failure to comply with the assurances that gave the right to 
cancel,” not the failure to give assurances. White, supra note 5, at 846. This 
interpretation of the law stands in contrast with the standard reading of the statute 
that says that if assurances are given, the insecure party must continue to perform. 
 98 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 227-30 (Howe ed., 1963) 
(1881). 
 99 Id. 
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B: A personal guaranty? Wow, that’s a pretty big step. You know, my 
company has been around for a long time. We’re in no real danger of 
insolvency. Why don’t you just give me until the end of the year? 
S: I’m sorry, but without a personal guaranty, I’m going to have to 
stop sending you product. 
B: Okay. I’ll give you the guaranty.100 
The existence of consideration is invariably a fact-
sensitive inquiry. Depending on the factual assumptions we 
make, it may be somewhat difficult to argue there is 
consideration for this promise, at least under the bargain 
theory of consideration. Perhaps the consideration is rooted in 
the seller’s forbearing from suspending his performance. But 
for that to be a detriment (or a benefit to the buyer), we would 
have to conclude that the seller had a legal right to do so. 
Under section 2-609, however, this right does not arise until 
there has been an actual breach or a breach by anticipatory 
repudiation (including a repudiation resulting from the 
promisee’s failure to respond to the demand for adequate 
assurances).101 Thus, while it seems as though there might be a 
  
 100 Some readers might observe that if the seller had the right to stop 
delivering product, then the buyer must be in breach. This being the case, why doesn’t 
the seller simply sue? If this is not the case, then the seller would be in breach by not 
delivering. This observation, while logical on its face, is something of a misconception. 
While it is true that there are many cases in which a promisor’s failure to perform will 
amount to a breach with a clear legal consequence, those are not the kinds of disputes 
in which adequate assurance doctrine is invoked. As Larry Garvin explains in his 
excellent article on adequate assurances: 
Relational contract is pertinent because the sort of contract under which 
adequate assurance is invoked almost always is relational. By definition, 
neither party has performed in full, which removes at a stroke almost all 
cash sales or ordinary credit sales where the goods are picked up on the spot. 
Rather, the usual sort of deal in these cases is a construction contract, or a 
long-term supply agreement, or a contract to manufacture specially-designed 
goods for some extended period—all potentially relational. In addition, 
adequate assurance normally comes about in part because the parties failed 
to define default in detail or otherwise provide expressly for allocating risks 
of the type that came about. In other words, the contracts are incomplete. 
Garvin, supra note 5, at 117. 
 101 U.C.C. § 2-609(4) (revised 2003); see also Garvin, supra note 5, at 115-20. 
The facts of Hornell v. Spry, 664 N.Y.S. 2d 698 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997), fall neatly into one 
of Garvin’s categories of typical assurances cases. The parties had a long-term supply 
contract that was never memorialized in a writing and thus devoid of any provisions 
defining default. What the court characterized as the parties’ first round of assurances 
was their attempt to provide the types of terms that might have governed their 
agreement in the first instance. If those terms had been agreed upon, Hornell would 
not have had to resort to a demand for assurances. Rather, it could have sued Spry for 
breach, assuming his conduct (which was not well explained in the opinion) violated his 
credit terms.  
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detriment to the promisee, careful analysis reveals that the 
insecure party didn’t have a right to suspend his performance 
at the moment the promisee gave the assurance. The time for 
performance had not yet passed and there had not been an 
unequivocal repudiation. Until the demand is rejected, or the 
assurances not given, there is no such right. So it would be 
circular to conclude that continuing to perform constitutes 
consideration, for it is only the refusal to give assurances that 
gives rise to the right to treat the promisor as in breach.102  
Maybe consideration can be found elsewhere. 
Consideration doctrine is famously malleable, and courts are 
usually able to find consideration for a promise whenever they 
are inclined to do so.103 Occasionally, this means reverting to the 
more easily satisfied test of Hamer v. Sidway,104 which requires 
only a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee, 
but does not require the element of inducement.105 Moreover, a 
well-counseled promisee would grant a concession in exchange 
for the assurance.106 Perhaps, as with modifications under the 
common law, a horse, hawk, or robe would suffice.107 Thus we 
  
 102 Even if this were legal detriment, it would be hard to argue that this 
detriment induced the promise to provide the guaranty. Rather, one imagines that the 
buyer gave the guaranty in order to ensure that the seller will continue to deliver 
product. In this we can begin to see the outlines of a claim of a modification made 
under duress. We shall pursue this idea shortly. 
 103 See, e.g., Allegheny Coll. v. Nat’l Chautauqua Cnty. Bank, 159 N.E. 173 
(N.Y. 1927) (finding consideration for a promise to donate to a college in the fact that 
the college, by accepting the pledge, had made an implied promise to create a named 
scholarship to memorialize the pledge); Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff Gordon, 118 N.E. 214 
(N.Y. 1917) (finding consideration in an implied promise to use best efforts to sell 
defendant’s fashions pursuant to an exclusive distribution agreement); DeCicco v. 
Schweizer, 117 N.E. 807 (N.Y. 1917). In his classic book, The Death of Contract, Grant 
Gilmore pointed out that in DeCicco, Chief Judge Cardozo found “consideration for a 
father’s promise to pay his engaged daughter an annuity after marriage in the fact that 
the engaged couple, instead of breaking off the engagement, had in fact married.” 
GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 69 (Ronald K.L. Collins ed., Ohio State 
Univ. Press 2d ed. 1974). 
 104 27 N.E. 256 (N.Y. 1891).  
 105 Farnsworth asserts that “Hamer is still very much alive, along with the 
notion that either a benefit or a detriment will suffice.” FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, 
§ 2.4, at 52 n.9; see also Weiner v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 443 N.E.2d 441, 444 (N.Y. 1982) 
(“[A]ny basic contemporary definition would include the idea that [consideration] 
consists of either a benefit to the promisor or a detriment to the promisee . . . [a]s 
elaborated in Hamer v. Sidway, the seminal case on the subject.”). 
 106 See FARNSWORTH, supra note 2, § 4.23, at 295-98. 
 107 This is the famous dictum of Lord Coke, explaining what new 
consideration could be offered to make a modification enforceable in the face of the pre-
existing duty rule. To supplement his quaint locution with something more appropriate 
to a commercial setting, Coke suggested that accepting payment at a different location 
than originally agreed to would be sufficient consideration to make enforceable a 
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might say that the consideration is the insecure party’s implied 
promise not to suspend its performance. But can a tacit 
promise induce a return promise? 
In some cases, however, consideration might be easier to 
find. For example, we might very plausibly assume that in our 
hypothetical, the contract included a term permitting the seller 
to cancel if the buyer is late in his payments. With this new 
fact, we can say with confidence that the seller’s willingness to 
stay in the contract—to waive his right to cancel—would be a 
bargained-for detriment, and would thus constitute 
consideration. 
Depending on the facts of the particular case, then, 
there may not be any consideration for the promise of the 
assurance. But that does not mean that the assurances cannot 
comprise an enforceable promise; assuming the non-existence 
of consideration simply moves us along to another branch of 
our analysis.  
Contract law has another significant justification for the 
enforcement of promises in the absence of consideration: 
reliance, i.e., the doctrine known as promissory estoppel.108 
Promissory estoppel, though not without its detractors,109 has 
been firmly established in American contract law for nearly a 
century.110 While there is some dispute at the theoretical level 
over whether promissory estoppel is properly understood as 
being rooted in promise or in the harm caused by one’s 
utterances, the legal requirements for the invocation of the 
doctrine are relatively clear. Under section 90 of the Second 
Restatement, “[a] promise which the promisor should 
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of 
the promisee or a third person and which does induce such 
action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only 
by enforcement of the promise.”111  
Promissory estoppel should provide a basis for enforcing 
assurance-promises in many cases. For our present purposes, 
let us take the example discussed above of the buyer who 
promises to furnish a personal guaranty. The seller relies on 
  
modification lowering the price. Pinnel’s Case, (1602) 77 Eng. Rep. 237 (Q.B.); 5 Co. 
Rep. 117a, 117b. 
 108 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). 
 109 See GILMORE, supra note 103, at 71. 
 110 See Benjamin F. Boyer, Promissory Estoppel: Principle from Precedents: I, 50 
MICH. L. REV. 639, 639-40 (1952) (explaining the development of promissory estoppel). 
 111 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). 
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this promise by continuing to deliver goods on credit, just as 
the promisor expects. If a court were to find that there is no 
consideration for this promise (for the sorts of reasons we 
discussed above), could the seller avoid making good on the 
guaranty? It seems quite clear that injustice would be the 
result if the court refused to enforce the promise. The results in 
cases involving claims of promissory estoppel are invariably 
fact-sensitive, but this generic example should suffice to 
establish a basis for recognizing that adequate assurances, in 
particular cases, can take the form of enforceable promises. 
But what if there is neither consideration nor actionable 
reliance? In such cases, we might argue that the promise is 
nevertheless enforceable by operation of statutory law—section 
2-609. There are other examples in contract law of promises 
being made enforceable by virtue of a statute even in the 
absence of consideration.112 For example, under section 2-209 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, a promise to modify a contract 
is enforceable despite the absence of consideration.113 So maybe 
there is consideration and maybe there’s no consideration, but 
the promise is enforceable nonetheless. 
The presence of consideration, in conclusion, will be a 
questionable proposition in many cases. There may be good 
reasons to believe that the promise of the guaranty in our 
hypothetical was not given for consideration, but, given the 
right facts, there will be at least a colorable argument to be 
made to the contrary. If one concludes that there really can be 
no consideration for such a promise, then one must either 
conclude that absent detrimental reliance, there is no basis for 
enforcement or that enforcement is a possibility solely on the 
basis of the statutory scheme of section 2-609. Alternatively, 
one might take the position that the determination of whether 
consideration exists must be taken up on a case-by-case basis, 
and that in those cases where consideration is found, the 
promise of the assurance may form the basis of a contract. 
Given the instability of grounding enforcement on 
consideration, it seems that the most promising basis for 
granting legal enforcement to the assurance promise would be 
that the promisee had relied on it to his detriment. In any 
event, it is not necessary for our analysis to be able to say 
  
 112 A Pennsylvania statute provides that a promise in writing may be 
enforceable even in the absence of consideration so long as the writing expresses the 
promisor’s intention to be legally bound. 33 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6 (West 2008). 
 113 U.C.C. § 2-209(1) (revised 2003). 
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categorically that all promises made when giving assurances 
are enforceable as contracts. It is enough to conclude that such 
treatment is possible, given the right facts. Moreover, the 
“right facts” exist outside of jerry-rigged hypotheticals; they 
appear commonly in real cases, like Hornell, the Arizona Iced 
Tea case.  
Whether or not a promise can be said to be supported by 
consideration or enforceable because of reliance, such indicia of 
enforceability are merely necessary conditions, not sufficient 
ones. Even a promise that has been detrimentally relied on 
may not be enforceable if it was not freely given.114 One of the 
foundational principles in contract law is consent; the law is 
careful not to impose contractual liability on persons who were 
in some sense coerced into entering a contract.  
B. Duress and Impaired Volition 
On a conceptual level, a demand for adequate 
assurances involves duress. An assurance pursuant to section 
2-609 is not really a promise freely given. The giver of the 
assurance does so not of his own volition, but rather because he 
is being threatened with legal sanction for failing to give it. 
This is an argument that at least one court has weighed in on. 
In Erwin Weller Co. v. Talon Inc., a buyer was having difficulty 
meeting his payment obligations to his seller.115 The parties 
amended their agreement to provide the buyer “an extended 
period to make payments due or coming due . . . and granted 
[the seller] a security interest in the [buyer’s] accounts 
receivable . . . .”116 The buyer argued that the amended 
agreement “did not constitute a valid contract because [he] 
signed it under duress.”117 The Supreme Court of North Dakota 
rejected this argument, stating that the promisee’s demand 
could not amount to duress because the insecure seller had a 
statutory right to the assurances.118  
So duress is an issue that theoretically could be 
marshaled as an argument against calling adequate assurances 
contracts, but doctrinally, it seems dubious. The legal 
  
 114 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 175 (1981) (“If a party’s 
manifestation of assent is induced by an improper threat by the other party that leaves 
the victim no reasonable alternative, the contract is voidable by the victim.”). 
 115 295 N.W.2d 172, 173 (S.D. 1980). 
 116 Id. 
 117 Id. at 174. 
 118 Id.  
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requirements for duress can be rather formidable119 and don’t 
seem to be present in the kinds of promises we’re talking about 
here. But this is not to say that a promisor could never 
successfully assert duress as a defense to liability for failing to 
live up to his assurances. When policing contractual 
modifications, contract law relaxes the more stringent legal 
requirements for duress that are imposed when duress is 
asserted as a defense to formation of an original contract.120 
David Snyder has argued that in the modification context, 
courts ought to, and in fact do, consider a lower standard of 
“coercion.”121  
Despite the doctrinal obstacles to characterizing a 
demand for adequate assurances as duress, Larry Garvin has 
argued forcefully that section 2-609 does, in fact, endorse 
duress.122 Describing a demand for assurances as “an offer that 
the promisor can’t refuse,” Garvin explains:  
One party to an agreement is placed in an awkward position; either 
it consents to an unwanted modification or it is held in breach and 
forced to pay damages. Though there is a choice here, it is most 
unpalatable, for the promisor cannot choose simply to go ahead with 
the contract originally agreed upon. Either way, the promisor will 
incur new liabilities, whether under the modified contract or under 
the breached contract. . . . That there is a choice does not eliminate 
duress; whether the choice was coerced is the real question.123  
  
 119 Duress traditionally required proof of physical compulsion or a threat 
thereof. The law has evolved to allow simply an “improper threat” to serve as the 
evidentiary basis as it moved away from recognizing only physical duress to economic 
duress and undue influence. In any event, most courts require some sort of threat. In 
addition, courts commonly require that the duress “resulted from defendant’s wrongful 
and oppressive conduct and not by plaintiff’s necessities.” W. R. Grimshaw Co. v. Nevil 
C. Withrow Co., 248 F.2d 896, 904 (8th Cir. 1957); see also Selmer Co. v. Blakeslee-
Midwest Co., 704 F.2d 924, 928 (7th Cir. 1983) (requiring a party claiming duress to 
show that its financial difficulties had been caused by the other party). So long as a 
promisee in fact had reasonable grounds for insecurity, it would be difficult to maintain 
that a demand for adequate assurances pursuant to section 2-609 could amount to 
wrongful and oppressive conduct. 
 120 Under section 89(a) of the Second Restatement, a modification is enforceable 
so long as it is “fair and equitable in view of circumstances not anticipated by the parties 
when the contract was made.” Thus attempts to avoid coerced modifications can succeed 
if they can be shown to be inequitable, irrespective of threats, or whether or not the 
complaining party’s difficulties were caused by the party seeking enforcement. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 89(a) (1981). 
 121 David V. Snyder, The Law of Contract and the Concept of Change: Public 
and Private Attempts to Regulate Modification, Waiver, and Estoppel, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 
607, 684. 
 122 Garvin, supra note 5, at 71, 135. 
 123 Id. at 135-36. 
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While duress may have some potential to limit the 
ability of an insecure party to extract additional undertakings 
from his counterpart, curiously, it also has the potential to 
afflict the insecure party as well. It is possible that the party 
giving the assurance is not the only one who may be under 
duress, not the only party with a somewhat impaired volition 
as relates to this supposed new contract arising out of the 
assurance. In several cases, courts have found that a demand 
was made and assurances were given, even though the parties 
didn’t realize that they had done so.124 They were engaging in 
the normal negotiating activity of working out their troubled 
deal, trying to come to some accommodation. When they could 
not and eventually ended up in litigation, the court said that 
their efforts to reach an understanding amounted to 
assurances demanded and given.125 For example, in AMF, Inc. v. 
McDonald’s Corp., AMF had agreed in 1968 to furnish 
McDonald’s with a technologically innovative computerized 
cash register and twenty-three production models.126 Plagued by 
technical problems, AMF struggled to produce the machines 
according to schedule.127 After several accommodations, 
McDonald’s asked AMF to suspend the production of the 
twenty-three units.128 AMF agreed, but ultimately sued 
McDonald’s for breach.129 The court ruled that McDonald’s had 
a right to cancel the contract pursuant to section 2-609.130  
While this sketch of the facts of AMF suggests the 
normal application of 2-609, there is something rather curious 
about the court’s ruling. McDonald’s never made a formal 
written demand for adequate assurances. Indeed, the reported 
facts of the case do not suggest that McDonald’s even made a 
formal oral demand. Thus it appears that the court fashioned a 
2-609 demand out of the parties’ routine attempts to work out 
their troubled contract.131  
So it is possible not only to be coerced by the insecure 
party into giving assurances, but also for the insecure party to 
receive assurances without him knowing it. The cases provide 
  
 124 Smyers v. Quartz Works Corp., 880 F. Supp. 1425, 1433 (D. Kan. 1995) 
(demand for payment should be construed as a demand for assurances). 
 125 Id.  
 126 536 F.2d 1167, 1168 (7th Cir. 1976). 
 127 Id. at 1169. 
 128 Id. 
 129 Id. 
 130 Id. at 1171. 
 131 See White, supra note 5, at 857-58. 
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another way that adequate assurances can be less than fully 
consensual. In these cases, demand for assurances is ruled to 
be a compulsory prerequisite to canceling the contract.132 For 
example, in National Farmers Organization v. Bartlett & Co., 
Grain, the parties entered into multiple contracts whereby 
NFO was to deliver specified amounts of grain to Bartlett.133 At 
some point, Bartlett began withholding payment “as protection 
against realized or potential loss caused by failure on the 
Seller’s part to perform all contracts not yet fully performed.”134 
NFO informed Bartlett on January 26, 1973 that it would not 
perform the remaining contracts until Bartlett paid a 
significant portion of the amounts due for grain already 
delivered.135 NFO never delivered any grain under the 
remaining contracts and Bartlett ultimately withheld some 
$18,000.136  
In its suit to recover the $18,000, NFO argued that 
Bartlett’s failure to pay in response to the statement was a 
repudiation.137 The court, however, ruled that NFO’s statement 
of January 26 was a repudiation.138 Although the court could 
have followed the example of the AMF court, finding the 
January 26 statement to be a demand for adequate assurances 
it declined to do so, stating, “[p]lainly, the seller could have 
availed itself of a section 2-609 remedy on January 26. Equally 
plainly, however, it did not do so.”139  
In Harlow & Jones, Inc. v. Advance Steel Co., the court 
took a similar position. Advance was to buy 1000 tons of 
European steel in three installments from Harlow.140 After 
accepting the first two shipments, the buyer expressed concern 
about the timeliness of the final delivery.141 The contract called 
for the steel to arrive by “September-October shipment,” 
though there was evidence of a trade usage indicating that this 
term contemplated that delivery by November 30 would be 
  
 132 But see GFSI, Inc. v. J-Loong Trading, Ltd., 505 F. Supp. 2d 935, 947 (D. 
Kan. 2007) (no written demand thus no protection of section 2-609). 
 133 560 F.2d 1350, 1352 (8th Cir. 1977). 
 134 Id. at 1353. 
 135 Id. 
 136  Id. at 1354. 
 137 Id. at 1356. 
 138 Id. at 1358. 
 139 Id. at 1355. 
 140 424 F. Supp. 770, 772 (E.D. Mich. 1976). 
 141 Id. at 773. 
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acceptable.142 On October 29, Advance sent a letter notifying 
Harlow of its intention to reject the final shipment because of 
late delivery.143 The steel arrived in mid-November.144 
In ruling that Advance’s rejection of the shipment 
amounted to a repudiation, the court asserted that “[h]ad 
Advance taken the course prescribed by sec. 2-609, Harlow 
would have had the opportunity to effect a timely delivery and 
so cure any delay in shipment. In light of this available 
remedy, Advance’s outright rejection of the contract on October 
29 . . . was unjustified.”145 
Under cases like NFO and Harlow, an insecure party 
appears not to have the option of treating defective 
performance as a breach or repudiation until he has asked for 
adequate assurances. Thus we might view the situation as one 
in which the insecure promisee can be seen as making a 
coerced demand for assurances and the underperforming 
promisor making a coerced promise.  
But even if one accepts this reading of these cases, it is 
important not to overstate their significance. For it would be 
revolutionary indeed to claim that all obligees must pass 
through section 2-609 (or section 251) on their way to treating 
an obligor’s delinquency as a breach entitling them to suspend 
performance. This is not the law, for if it were, it would render 
the doctrine of present breach by anticipatory repudiation 
meaningless.146 Rather, the broadly accepted view is the one 
propounded by the Restatement, that where a promisor has 
committed a total breach, the promisee is entitled to suspend 
performance and sue for damages.147 Nevertheless, in all of this, 
we can see that there are significant issues of consensuality 
that might affect our view of the promissory character of 
adequate assurances. But the doctrines of consent and duress 
will not serve as a total bar to enforcement. 
This Part has shown that there is a substantial 
doctrinal basis for the claim that a promise made in response to 
a demand for adequate assurances could be treated in law as 
an enforceable contract. Although there is some theoretical 
  
 142 Id.  
 143 Id. at 776. 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. at 778. 
 146 But see Hillman, supra note 5, at 559 (arguing that making recourse to § 2-
609 a mandatory predicate to cancelling a contract would best serve the purposes of 
Article 2). 
 147 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 237, 242 (1981). 
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basis for questioning the consensual nature of such a promise, 
no court has taken such a duress argument seriously. In Parts 
IV and V, we will consider the consequences of treating the 
assurance-promise as a distinct contract. 
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF TREATING ASSURANCES AS 
ENFORCEABLE PROMISES—DURATION 
If we are to treat assurances as a distinct promise 
comprising an enforceable contract, we must address the 
ramifications of such a classification. One particularly 
significant consequence would be the effect on remedies, a topic 
we explore below in Part V. A related question relates to the 
duration or life span of the assurance: How long must the 
promisor continue to perform the undertakings of the 
assurances? Should the promises contained in the assurances 
continue to bind the promisor even after the original contract 
has come to an end, whether it has been breached, cancelled, or 
otherwise terminated? If the assurance amounts to an 
enforceable contract, then it stands to reason that the duration 
of the promisor’s obligation to perform should not necessarily 
be yoked to the duration of the original contract. We might ask 
whether, in a case like Hornell148 (the Arizona Iced Tea case), a 
party in Spry’s position would have been bound to continue 
performing in accordance with his assurances for the life of the 
contract and beyond, had the parties continued in their 
contractual relationship after agreeing to more restrictive 
terms. Or would he be entitled to enjoy the parties’ original 
financing arrangement once he had established a track record 
of responsible behavior, thus putting an end to Hornell’s 
grounds for insecurity?  
To begin to answer these vexing questions of duration, 
let us return to the example of the personal guaranty given in 
response to a demand for adequate assurances. It is not 
controversial to say that a guaranty often endures beyond the 
lifespan of the original contract. Indeed, on some level, the 
guaranty doesn’t really even spring to life until the original 
contract has come to an end (at least from the unpaid obligee’s 
perspective).149 To be sure, a guaranty serves an important role 
  
 148 Hornell v. Spry, 664 N.Y.S.2d 698 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1997). 
 149 In the terminology of the Third Restatement of Suretyship and Guaranty, 
the contract of guaranty involves three parties: a creditor who is owed a duty, termed the 
obligee; a debtor who owes the duty, the primary obligor; and a guarantor or surety who 
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from the moment it is given, for it gives the obligee the security 
to continue performing; indeed this is one of its primary raisons 
d’etre.150 But on the other hand, a guaranty is in some sense 
dormant until the primary obligor defaults on his obligation. It 
is at that moment that the guaranty fully actualizes. Often, 
though not in all cases, this moment will roughly coincide with 
the underlying contract coming to an end, whether through 
breach, termination or cancellation. Thus, in many instances, a 
guaranty will outlive the contractual relationship from which it 
arose. On this basis, we can assert that in some cases, the 
promise of an assurance can endure beyond the life of the 
original contract, and be seen as a distinct contract.  
But the question of duration is not always so clear. 
Consider the example of the assignment of receivables. The 
buyer buys on credit from the seller and is falling behind in his 
payments. Ultimately, in response to a demand for adequate 
assurances, the buyer agrees to assign his receivables to the 
seller. For a while, both parties find this plan agreeable; the 
seller is getting his money and the buyer is willing to assign 
the receivables as long as he is getting the goods. Imagine, 
however, that after some period of time, the buyer realizes that 
he no longer wants to continue in this arrangement, though he 
is still in arrears. Under these circumstances, with the seller 
still insecure about getting paid both for amounts past due and 
those due on shipments he continues to make, it makes sense 
to support a rule requiring that the assignment must persist.  
But what if the contract terminates while the buyer is 
still in arrears? This scenario presents us with a different and 
more interesting question. Assume that the buyer terminates 
the principal purchase agreement in accordance with the 
contract’s termination provisions, and wants his cash flow 
back. Does the assignment live on beyond the life span of the 
contract, or must the seller resort to legal process in order to 
get paid? The seller would like to continue with the assignment 
as a sort of self-help remedy, and the buyer wishes he had 
never made the promise. Does the assignment arrangement 
continue on for some duration, such as until the contract 
payments are all made? Or is it a sort of appendage to the 
principal contract, relying on that contract for its heartbeat 
  
promises to perform, or pay damages on the primary obligor’s behalf, the secondary 
obligor. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF SURETYSHIP AND GUARANTY § 1 (1996). 
 150 See Avery Wiener Katz, An Economic Analysis of the Guarantee Contract, 
66. U. CHI. L. REV. 47 (1999). 
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and blood supply? Is the answer any different if the contract 
comes to an end because of an unrelated breach, for example, if 
the buyer fails to place minimum orders. What if the seller 
breaches?  
Although the case law provides precious little guidance 
in choosing between these two approaches to the duration 
question, one exception can be found in Hornell. Recall that in 
Hornell, Spry, the buyer, agreed to tighter credit terms in 
response to Hornell’s initial demand for adequate assurances.151 
These included capping any outstanding credit at $300,000 and 
requiring Spry to repay all amounts loaned with fourteen 
days.152 Shortly after the parties reached this agreement, Spry 
arranged to have his balance paid in full, but proceeded 
immediately to place an order for somewhere between $390,000 
and $450,000.153 Hornell refused to fill this order without 
further assurances, including a personal guaranty.154 The court 
noted that Spry’s order not only exceeded the agreed limit, but 
also “placed Hornell in a position where it would have no 
opportunity to learn whether Spry would meet the 14-day 
payment terms, before Spry again became indebted to Hornell 
for a very large sum of money.”155 The court further stated that 
the “arrangement, by its terms, clearly contemplated an 
opportunity for Hornell to test out defendants’ ability to make 
payment with 14-day periods.”156 
Although the facts of Hornell do not mesh perfectly with 
those of the hypothetical, the court’s comments can be read to 
suggest a flexible approach to duration aimed at making 
certain that the assurance lasts as long as needed to assuage 
the insecurity. They also suggest that the assurance is 
intended to protect the insecure party against further loss. 
These dicta from Hornell thus shed some light on our question 
about duration. Yet, to arrive at a more satisfying answer, we 
must look beyond the case law to the Official Comments to 
section 2-609, which articulate the purposes of the doctrine. 
  
 151 Hornell, 664 N.Y.S.2d at 701. 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. 
 155 Id. at 703 (emphasis omitted). 
 156 Id. 
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A. The Purposes that Animate the Doctrine of Adequate 
Assurances  
Further insight into the question of duration may be 
found in a careful examination of the purposes of adequate 
assurances, as conceived by Llewellyn and the other drafters of 
Article 2. Their view, broadly stated, is that assurances are 
given to ensure that the insecure party might continue 
performing free from insecurity. Let us once again take a look 
at the Official Comment to section 2-609, which states:  
The section rests on the recognition of the fact that the essential 
purpose of a contract between commercial men is actual performance 
and they do not bargain merely for a promise, or for a promise plus 
the right to win a lawsuit and that a continuing sense of reliance and 
security that the promised performance will be forthcoming when 
due, is an important feature of the bargain. If either the willingness 
or the ability of a party to perform declines materially between the 
time of contracting and the time for performance, the other party is 
threatened with the loss of a substantial part of what he has 
bargained for. A seller needs protection not merely against having to 
deliver on credit to a shaky buyer, but also against having to procure 
and manufacture the goods, perhaps turning down other customers. 
Once he has been given reason to believe that the buyer’s performance 
has become uncertain, it is an undue hardship to force him to 
continue his own performance. Similarly, a buyer who believes that 
the seller’s deliveries have become uncertain cannot safely wait for the 
due date of performance when he has been buying to assure himself of 
materials for his current manufacturing or to replenish his stock of 
merchandise.157 
A close reading of this paragraph reveals several 
rationales for the doctrine. Taken roughly in the order 
presented, the first appears to be an affirmation of the 
expectation interest. In saying that “commercial men . . . do not 
bargain merely for a promise, or for a promise plus the right to 
win a lawsuit,”158 the Comment appears to view a principal 
purpose of section 2-609 as being to ensure that the promisee 
receives what he has been promised without resorting to 
judicial process. The Comment can also be read as expressing a 
concern for the psychological state of the insecure party. There 
is disutility in fearing that the promisor will not perform and 
assurances go some way to assuage that fear. Next, the 
Comment suggests a desire to minimize the insecure 
promisee’s potential reliance loss or opportunity cost that may 
  
 157 U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 1 (revised 2003) (emphasis added). 
 158 Id. 
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result from staying in a contract with a shaky or flaky 
counterpart. If the promisor is unwilling to give the 
assurances, the insecure party can cut its loss by refusing to 
manufacture or deliver goods to the promisor or by arranging 
to sell them elsewhere.159 A fourth rationale, expressed in terms 
of the “undue hardship” to the promisee who must “continue 
his own performance” when the promisor’s “performance has 
become uncertain,” can be characterized as a concern for 
holding the deal together. The implication is that if the 
assurances are given, the promisee is relieved of an undue 
hardship and will be more likely to continue in the contractual 
relationship. While the Official Comment does not explicitly 
state this as a value, commentators have recognized this 
purpose of the doctrine160 and it comports with one of 
Llewellyn’s overarching purposes in shaping Article 2.161  
Other purposes, also not suggested by the text of the 
Comment, are served by the doctrine. Among these are: 
fostering communication between the parties,162 encouraging 
dispute resolution outside of the courts,163 and serving as a self-
help enforcement mechanism.164 I will discuss these purposes in 
turn, considering whether they offer any support for the view 
that assurance promises ought to be enforced even after the 
underlying contract ceases to be in effect. 
B. Are the Purposes of the Doctrine Furthered by Enforcing 
Assurance Promises After the Underlying Contract Has 
Been Terminated? 
If we view adequate assurances as being primarily 
concerned with holding the deal together, then it hardly makes 
sense to require the promisor to continue in the assignment of 
  
 159 If the promisor gives the assurances, then either he will make good on the 
contract (the increased probability of which he has signaled by giving the assurance), 
or he will breach. If he breaches, then the promisee’s reliance loss in a given case may 
not have been reduced by the assurances (though he still might have acted to minimize 
his reliance despite the assurances), but the ex ante reliance loss has decreased as a 
result of the use of section 2-609. 
 160 See Garvin, supra note 5, at 124-27; Taylor, supra note 5, at 883-85. 
 161 See Richard A. Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 621 (1975); Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The 
Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl Llewellyn’s Attempt to Achieve The Good, The True, The 
Beautiful in Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1149 (1985). 
 162 See Taylor, supra note 5, at 884. 
 163 Id. 
 164 Id. 
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his receivables once the contract has been terminated. This 
much seems self-evident. Similarly, if we are concerned about 
the psychological dimension of insecurity, nothing on this score 
is gained if we require assurances to remain in effect after the 
contract is terminated. These rationales together seem to offer 
little to the promisee who seeks to use adequate assurances to 
further his interest in being made whole.  
The doctrine of adequate assurances has been 
applauded for its functions of fostering communication. It may 
be difficult to see how the communication-inducing function of 
the doctrine could be used to support extended duration of the 
assurance promise. But Professor Taylor points out that section 
2-609 is useful because it provides a legal reason and 
framework for a promisee to notify a promisor of valuable 
information:  
Often [the underperforming promisor] may be unaware that the 
PFB165 has serious concerns about its performance. By seeking 
assurances the PFB gives notice of its perception of problems. Upon 
such notice, the potentially breaching party can take steps to either 
clarify that the PFB is mistaken or to remedy problems that do exist. 
Demanding assurance that performance will be forthcoming thus 
forces both parties to assess the status of the contract and to 
communicate their understanding to each other. Assurances 
encourage organic solidarity between parties by ensuring that each 
remains vested in the contract. Finally, adequate assurances protect 
the benefit of the bargain by recognizing the importance of the 
interest in future performance and thereby promote commercial 
certainty.166  
Taylor’s commentary on the communication-fostering 
aspect of adequate assurances is important to our 
understanding of the functions and purposes of the doctrine, 
but despite its elegant support for the doctrine as a whole, it 
fails to provide any basis for using this aspect to assist in 
answering our question about duration. 
Taylor has also argued that section 2-609 can be 
effective as an alternative dispute resolution device.167 If the 
parties are inclined to cooperate, they can resolve their conflict 
by using the mechanism of assurances. Successfully avoiding 
litigation will depend on the promisor both acknowledging his 
own problematic course of performance and agreeing that the 
  
 165 In Professor Taylor’s terminology, a PFB is a “party facing breach”—an 
insecure party. See id. at 859. 
 166 Id. at 884. 
 167 Id. 
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assurances requested are reasonable. Of course these 
conditions are not always present, as there has been no dearth 
of reported cases involving disputes over the grounds for 
insecurity and the adequacy or excessiveness of the assurances 
demanded.168 But even where the parties have been able to 
agree on both the cause of the insecurity and the 
appropriateness of the demand, there is little reason to believe 
that the promisor will find anything in section 2-609 to induce 
him to continue to assign his receivables after the original 
contract has been terminated, without a mandate from a court. 
The very absence of judicial precedent on this issue makes it 
hard to imagine that a promisor would believe that he was 
under any obligation to do so.  
However, it is important at this point to note that we 
are not here striving for a principle that will make a promisor 
wish to continue to adhere to his assurances. Rather, we seek a 
compelling rationale to support a particular legal rule. We do 
not imagine that our arguments will in fact cause the promisor 
to continue diverting his cash flows to the insecure party, but 
aim to construct an obligation to do so. Moreover, the purpose 
of this entire article is not simply to divine the intention of the 
drafters of section 2-609, but rather to arrive at appropriate 
answers to questions which, by hypothesis, the drafters have 
not considered. The breach of this obligation, which we may 
very well expect, will cause a legally cognizable harm, the 
remedy for which will be discussed in the next Part. As we will 
see, if indeed the law requires the promisor to continue to 
perform the assurance promise, a very interesting question of 
damages arises.  
In light of this analysis, a rule supporting continued 
enforcement of the assurance promises beyond the life of the 
underlying contract can be said to further the purpose of 
encouraging alternative dispute resolution, if in a somewhat 
diffuse way, by notifying future promisors of the consequences 
of failing to fully perform their assurance promises. 
To a significant degree, much of the same can be said of 
the view of adequate assurances as a self-help measure. 
Professor Taylor has written that “section 2-609 is a powerful 
statutory incorporation of self-help.”169 Taylor defines self-help 
as “private actions taken by those interested in the controversy 
  
 168 See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text. 
 169 Taylor, supra note 5, at 883.  
2010] ADEQUATE ASSURANCES OF PERFORMANCE 203 
to prevent or resolve disputes without official assistance of a 
governmental official or disinterested third party.”170 Taylor’s 
definition thus distinguishes self-help from alternative dispute 
resolution (“ADR”) by excluding from the category of self-help 
mediation, arbitration, court guided settlement efforts and the 
like. But there is another important difference in the context of 
adequate assurances that makes self-help a more central 
rationale for the doctrine than ADR. ADR is a consensual 
phenomenon. Recourse to the courts is always an option for 
parties to a contractual dispute unless they have mutually 
agreed, either at the time of formation or at the time of the 
dispute, to pursue ADR. By contrast, self-help is more one-
sided; it is a mechanism for an aggrieved party to enforce his 
rights without the assistance of the judiciary. With adequate 
assurances, the mechanism is provided by statute and, as we 
have seen, entitles the insecure promisee to extract a promise 
that will allow him to receive the benefit of his bargain without 
the cost, trouble, and relational harm that litigation entails. 
Thus, as a matter of both judicial economy and the convenience 
of the parties, the self-help function of the doctrine of adequate 
assurances supports the conclusion that courts ought to rule 
that the assurance promise is enforceable beyond the life-span 
of the underlying contract.  
We are left, then, with two final candidates to support 
extended duration: the purpose of making the promisee whole 
and the purpose of helping the promisee avoid excessive 
reliance costs. I have saved the best for last. These final two 
purposes of adequate assurances unambiguously support an 
expansive view of the duration of the assurance. It bears 
remembering that section 2-609 is, in fact, a remedial 
provision. As such, its application ought to be informed by the 
so-called “spirit of the remedies” provision of section 1-103. 
This provision states that “[t]he remedies provided by this Act 
shall be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved 
party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had 
fully performed . . . .”171 
These two rationales for the doctrine must be seen as 
carrying greater weight than many of the others that have 
been discussed. Communication and assuaging psychological 
insecurity seem flighty and insignificant when measured 
  
 170 Id. at 841. I do not adhere strictly to this scheme of classification. 
 171 U.C.C. § 1-106 (revised 2001). 
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against the bottom line economic realities of the parties’ 
relationship. Avoiding litigation, while an important function of 
the doctrine, cannot be seen as more than a secondary function 
in the context of a legal code that purports to provide rules 
binding on the courts. Similarly, while self-help may be the 
primary purpose of some legal provisions, such as those 
relating to the execution of liens pursuant to a perfected 
security interest, it cannot be as important as the goal of 
sorting out economic rights and entitlements in a contractual 
relationship. The only other rationale of comparable 
importance is holding the deal together. Taken together, 
making the insecure party whole and holding the deal together 
are thus the two most important purposes of the doctrine. But 
as we have observed, once we have limited our focus to 
situations in which the underlying contract is no longer in 
force, the importance of holding the deal together evaporates.  
When we talk about making the insecure party whole, 
we must consider two related concepts. The first is the 
reduction of costs associated with the insecurity. The Official 
Comment alludes to these costs, as do many commentators.172 
The second, which is the immediate focus of our attention, is 
the protection of the expectation or reliance interests 
implicated by the promise of the assurance. These two amounts 
are sometimes, but not always, the same. In our present 
example of the assignment of receivables, they are the same. 
When the promisee seeks to continue in the assignment 
arrangement, he seeks not only the satisfaction of the promise 
of the assurance, but also to receive amounts due under the 
original contract.173 We will see examples in the next Part 
where the assurance promise creates the possibility that the 
promisor will become obligated to the promisee for amounts in 
excess of any due under the original contract. 
But if we acknowledge—as we must—that the drafters 
of section 2-609 were concerned with the promisee’s economic 
loss, and we take full account of the spirit of the remedies 
section, it is hard to see why the assignment of receivables 
should not continue until the promisor’s obligation is satisfied, 
irrespective of the termination of the contract. The promisor 
has promised to commit those cash flows to the repayment of 
  
 172 See Craswell, supra note 5, at 410-14; Garvin, supra note 5, at 112-16. 
 173 The promisee’s reliance costs are equal to the amounts he advanced to the 
promisor in reliance on his promise to assign receivables. His expectation interest is 
the same amount: he expects to be paid for his goods under the principal contract. 
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the obligation, and if we are to take seriously the promissory 
character of adequate assurances, then until that promise has 
been fulfilled, it should be enforced.  
If it is not to be enforced, the law ought to impose upon 
the promisor the burden of explaining why. As we have already 
discussed in Part III, the reason might be a want of 
consideration. But if the insecure promisee was well-counseled, 
he may have had the forethought to offer something in exchange 
for the promise. Alternatively, the promisee may have 
detrimentally relied on the promise (a wrinkle we will revisit in 
the next Part). The promisor might argue that his promise was 
coerced, but absent strong facts suggesting duress, he is not 
likely to succeed on that issue. Finally, the strongest possibility 
for categorically denying enforcement of the assurance promise 
once the original contract has come to an end lies in the 
possibility of treating the assurance promise as a modification of 
the original contract, rather than as a separate contract. We 
shall explore that possibility in the Epilogue. 
In sum, there appears to be no reason to categorically 
deny enforcement of the assurance promise under the 
circumstances presented by our hypothetical. It is possible that 
the facts of the particular case will furnish reasons to do so, but 
at this point, there remains a strong case to be made for 
embracing the promissory character of adequate assurances and 
enforcing the assurance promise as a contract in its own right. 
To the extent that we view adequate assurances as a 
doctrine whose primary purpose is to hold the deal together, we 
would be disinclined to conclude that certain assurance promises 
should endure in force after termination or breach, for once the 
promisee’s own performance obligations have come to an end, 
the insecurity, and thus the need for the assurances, vanishes.  
Yet, as the language of the Official Comment makes 
clear, holding the deal together is not the only rationale for the 
doctrine.174 It fosters other values, such as promoting 
communication between parties, encouraging dispute 
resolution, creating a self-help mechanism, and, above all, 
minimizing the promisee’s economic loss.175 When we consider 
these other purposes, particularly ensuring that an injured 
party is compensated for his loss, it makes less sense to 
conclude that the assignment should stop once the contract is 
  
 174  U.C.C. § 2-609 cmt. 1 (revised 2003). 
 175  Id. 
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terminated. If we treat the new promise as enduring even after 
the original contract has terminated, then we are embracing a 
view of adequate assurances as a sort of self-help remedy. The 
insecure party has been harmed and is empowered by law to 
extract a promise that will help make him whole. Until he has 
been made whole, the promise should retain its legal effect.  
The question of duration is evidently a complicated one, 
which the courts have not yet adequately addressed. I hope I 
have presented a framework for thinking about how to resolve 
it. Ultimately, it probably ought to be answered with reference 
to the facts of an individual case, and will depend upon the 
courts coming to a clearer view of which of the competing 
rationales for adequate assurances is the most compelling. 
Whichever view of duration eventually prevails, there remains 
one final set of issues—indeed the most important set for 
litigants—to be addressed. 
V. CONSEQUENCES FOR DAMAGES 
Apart from—and probably more important than—the 
implications for the duration of the promise, treating an 
assurance as an independently enforceable contract raises the 
question of what damages might be available for its breach. 
Specifically, can the injured party recover the full measure of 
damages for the breach of the assurance promise even where 
the original contract provided for some limitation on remedies? 
Such restrictions can take many forms, including stipulated 
damages, limitation to repair or replacement of defective parts, 
and exclusion of consequential damages. 
In this part, I would like to explore the proposition that 
if the assurances comprise an enforceable promise, then the 
limitations on damages from the original contract should not 
apply to the new contract. The appeal of this position rests in 
logic, but there may be doctrinal or theoretical reasons that 
militate against it. To aid in our discussion of these 
considerations, consider the following hypothetical conflict that 
illustrates how the issue might arise. 
Suppose we have a buyer and a seller who enter into a 
contract for the manufacture and sale of a specialized piece of 
machinery. The buyer has notified the seller about special 
losses he will suffer if the goods are not delivered in working 
order by a certain date. Despite the buyer’s disclosure that he 
will lose significant amounts of profitable business with each 
week the machine is late, the parties’ contract limits 
2010] ADEQUATE ASSURANCES OF PERFORMANCE 207 
consequential damages to one thousand dollars per week for 
lateness. Alternatively, we might imagine that the damages 
are simply limited to the cost of repair or replacement. As 
things turn out, before the time for delivery has arrived, the 
seller is having trouble getting the machine to work properly 
and announces that delivery will be delayed. The buyer, feeling 
insecure, demands assurances from the seller, specifically, 
retaining a special consultant to redesign the machine and 
troubleshoot the manufacturing process. The seller promises to 
do this. It comes to pass that the seller, confident that she will 
be able to solve the problem herself, and wishing to avoid the 
added expense of the expert consultant, never actually enlists 
the help of the expert, and the machine is never properly 
delivered.  
The seller has thus conceivably breached two contracts. 
Can the buyer sue on that second promise and avoid the 
limitation of damages that is contained in the principal 
contract, but not agreed to in the context of the assurances? If 
the promise of the assurance is treated as a contract, and the 
buyer suffers damages that are ordinarily recoverable under 
law, then the buyer ought to recover his full loss. Yet this 
conclusion may strike some readers as wrong at an intuitive 
level. 
As we consider whether some legal principle informs our 
uneasiness with this conclusion, we should acknowledge a 
fundamental factual assumption built into this hypothetical. 
This story assumes that the parties never bothered to work out 
the details of their assurances agreement. This is a completely 
realistic assumption; the cases reveal that parties pay 
relatively little attention to their assurances. In fact, as we 
have seen, parties sometimes do not even realize that they 
have actually demanded and given assurances.176 Indeed, in his 
study of a sampling of cases on adequate assurances, Professor 
James J. White reached this very conclusion, asserting that 
most cases do not involve a highly conscious or formal process 
of demanding and giving assurances; rather, they are decided 
on the basis of a judge’s construction of the parties’ haphazard, 
even unintentional, invocation of the doctrine.177 
Thus, another way of looking at this problem of 
damages is that it is one of incomplete contracts and default 
  
 176 See supra notes 121-43 and accompanying text. 
 177 See White, supra note 5, at 857-59. 
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rules.178 In other words, we can say that the problem for our 
buyer and seller is that, in agreeing to the assurances, they 
failed to negotiate and memorialize any agreement about the 
availability of consequential damages or damages otherwise in 
excess of those recoverable under the original contract. 
The theory of default rules proceeds from the 
recognition that a fully specified contract—one in which the 
parties contemplate all possible contingencies and negotiate 
their contract to provide for them—is an impossibility.179 Parties 
economize on transaction costs by negotiating only the most 
important terms, employing boilerplate, and leaving the 
resulting gaps to be filled by contract law, which supplies the 
default rules that will govern the situations that the parties 
themselves have not provided for.180 Default rules can be 
broadly classed into two groups: majoritarian defaults and 
penalty defaults. A majoritarian default is one designed to 
approximate the rule most parties would have agreed to, had 
they taken the time to negotiate over the issue.181 Majoritarian 
defaults thus are intended to be intuitive and unobjectionable, 
and often involve standards of reasonableness.182  
Contract theorists have identified a second form of 
default rule, described as a penalty default. A penalty default, 
as the name suggests, is designed to penalize one party or 
another, creating a winner and loser ex ante.183 This sort of rule 
may be desirable to the extent that it has its intended effect: 
forcing parties to reveal information and bargain over the term 
in question before entering into the contract.184 This 
“information-forcing” effect, in turn, can increase the value of 
the contract to the parties and reduce the likelihood of 
litigation.185 Also, since the information the parties have 
revealed to each other is often memorialized in the contract, 
  
 178 See Barry E. Adler, The Questionable Assent of Hadley v. Baxendale, 51 
STAN. L. REV. 1547 (1999); Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Strategic Contractual 
Inefficiency and the Optimal Choice of Legal Rules, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992) 
[hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Contractual Inefficiency]; Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, 
Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE 
L.J. 87 (1989) [hereinafter Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps]. 
 179 Ayres & Gertner, Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 178, at 730. 
 180 Id. at 731. 
 181 Id.  
 182  Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 178, at 91. 
 183 Id. at 95-100. 
 184 Id. at 97. 
 185 Ayres & Gertner, Contractual Inefficiency, supra note 178, at 735. 
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the parties are ultimately revealing more information to the 
courts, which reduces the costs of litigation should any ensue.186 
In the context of this discussion, the question then 
becomes, what is the best default rule to govern the question of 
whether the insecure party can recover damages from the 
breach of the assurance promise in excess of those available 
under the principal contract? Let us first consider the best 
majoritarian default. The primary explanation for the 
incompleteness of contracts is, as mentioned above, 
economizing on transaction costs. It seems rather obvious to 
suppose that the damages rule most parties would prefer would 
be one that carries over the damages rule the parties had 
agreed to in their principal contract (I will call that the 
Carryover Rule). Having expended the time and resources to 
negotiate limitations on damages when forming their contract 
(recall the hypothetical), the parties would not agree ex ante to 
a rule that nullifies the effect of their earlier effort and requires 
them to renegotiate the same issue in the stressful context of 
their deteriorating relationship (which I will call the 
Independent Damages Rule). I take this line of reasoning to be 
the basis for any intuitive discomfort we might have with an 
Independent Damages Rule. The Carryover Rule would also 
have the advantage of being a rule that most business persons 
would expect to govern. As they are not excessively focused on 
obscure questions of law, we might expect them to think, why 
would the law disregard the agreement we have already 
reached on the availability of damages?187 
The Independent Damages Rule, on the other hand, 
would make an appropriate penalty default. Since the 
underperforming promisor would be liable for greater damages 
under this rule, she would have an incentive to negotiate with 
the insecure party over this term at the time she gives the 
assurances. This is not to say that she would necessarily 
  
 186 Ayres & Gertner, Filling Gaps, supra note 178, at 97. 
 187 Imputing this sort of common-sense reasoning to business persons 
comports with Llewellyn’s view of what a body of commercial law ought to be. See 
Snyder, supra note 43, at 22-25. Llewellyn wrote: 
The legal profession needs to have the men of commerce think of law and 
legal work, not as a baffling intricacy of ununderstandable [sic] technicality, 
but as a helpful device which can be seen, directly, to be helpful though safety 
requires the use of a lawyer’s skills in developing its help. . . . Commercial 
law requires to be for consumption by commercial men, as well as lawyers.  
Memorandum from Karl Llewellyn on The Reasons for a Uniform Commercial Code (c. 
1940), in WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 524-35 (1973). 
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convince her counterpart to agree to alter the rule, but it might 
have the beneficial effect of inducing her to reveal information 
about the likelihood of her actually performing the new 
obligation she has undertaken. It would also cause her to 
compare the cost of non-performance with the cost of 
performance. This, in turn, could lead either to a more 
complete negotiation of the assurances, or to a reconfiguration 
of the original damages arrangement. Information about the 
likelihood of her compliance with the assurances would also 
assist the insecure party in determining the extent to which he 
should continue to rely on the principal contract and her 
assurances. Perhaps he has the opportunity to seek substitute 
goods elsewhere, make alternative arrangement with his 
customers, or hedge in some other manner. Finally, the 
information-forcing nature of the Independent Damages Rule 
would create greater certainty and predictability in any future 
litigation, for the parties would likely have memorialized any 
understanding they reached during their negotiations, and this 
documentation would aid a court in determining and enforcing 
the parties’ intentions.  
To appreciate another way that the information-forcing 
character of a penalty default could be useful, consider a 
variation to our hypothetical. Assume now that in negotiating 
the original contract, the buyer had not spelled out the likely 
loss he would realize if the seller were to deliver the machine 
late and that the only limitation on damages is a repair or 
replacement clause. Suppose also that the buyer has received 
substantial orders for goods that will be made with the seller’s 
machine. If the Independent Damages Rule were in place, it 
would operate to induce the buyer to reveal to the seller the 
potential loss if she does not deliver the machine promptly. 
Armed with this information, and the knowledge that she will 
be liable under the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale188 for lost profits 
incurred by the buyer, the seller will be able to make a better-
informed judgment about how much effort to put into 
performing. This knowledge might also cause her to reevaluate 
whether in fact it is efficient for her to give the assurances the 
buyer requested; perhaps it would be better for her to breach 
the original contract and either settle with the buyer or leave 
herself liable only for the damages set out in the original 
contract. 
  
 188 (1854) 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (Ct. Exch.); 9 Exch. Rep. 341. 
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The foregoing discussion suggests that while the 
Carryover Damages Rule may comport with our intuition about 
what damages ought to be available, it tends to reinforce a 
problem that seems endemic to the adequate assurances 
process: the fact that parties appear not to pay sufficient 
attention to it. 
Our discussion of the damages rule has, to this point, 
proceeded in reference to a hypothetical involving the 
availability of expectation damages. I consider this to be, in 
general, the weaker case for invoking the Independent 
Damages Rule.189 I will now introduce a hypothetical that 
presents detrimental reliance as the basis for imposing such a 
rule. Suppose an individual has hired an architect to design 
and build an architecturally significant house. The architect is 
running into a variety of problems, giving the landowner 
reasonable grounds for insecurity. In response to the buyer’s 
demand, the architect promises to bring in Frank Gehry as a 
consultant to solve the design problems. The buyer is delighted 
at having extracted this promise, and perceives that his house 
will be much more valuable when it becomes known that Frank 
Gehry was a design consultant for the house. He informs other 
wealthy architecture enthusiasts about his soon-to-be-built 
Frank Gehry home. He then enters into a contract to sell the 
home. As it turns out, the architect completes the house on 
time and perfectly according to specification. But, as you have 
probably guessed, he never hired Frank Gehry.  
  
 189 My sense of the comparative weakness of the case of expectation damages 
is of a piece with Fuller and Perdue’s classic evaluation of the relative strength of the 
moral claims of the expectation, reliance, and restitution interests in contract law. As 
Fuller and Perdue explain:  
[T]he promisee who has actually relied on the promise, even though he may 
not thereby have enriched the promisor, certainly presents a more pressing 
case for relief than the promisee who merely demands satisfaction for his 
disappointment in not getting what was promised him. In passing from 
compensation for change of position to compensation for loss of expectancy we 
pass, to use Aristotle’s terms again, from the realm of corrective justice to 
that of distributive justice. The law no longer seeks merely to heal a 
disturbed status quo, but to bring into being a new situation. It ceases to act 
defensively or restoratively, and assumes a more active role. With the 
transition, the justification for legal relief loses its self-evident quality. It is 
as a matter of fact no easy thing to explain why the normal rule of contract 
recovery should be that which measures damages by the value of the 
promised performance. 
Lon L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages (Pt. 
I), 46 YALE L.J. 52, 55-56 (1936). 
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This hypothetical presents two important features that 
challenge our understanding of the promissory character of 
adequate assurances of performance. First, we have a promisor 
who has fully performed his contract without any breach 
whatsoever. Second, the promisee’s reliance loss seems to be 
unrelated to the undertakings of the original contract. I have 
designed this hypothetical to strain the view of adequate 
assurances I have endorsed throughout this article. In this 
scenario, almost all of the values that adequate assurances 
aims to further are out the window. We are not holding the 
deal together. The promisee’s opportunistic reselling of his 
Frank Gehry house has nothing to do with either the 
psychological or economic dimensions of insecurity. In 
performing the principal contract, the builder has made the 
promisee whole. Finally, we may have a residual intuitive 
sense that enforcing this promise simply is not what the 
doctrine of adequate assurances is all about. 
However, at a certain level, none of these considerations 
is really relevant at all. For what we have is a promise—a 
promise that was detrimentally relied upon. We enforce 
promises either because they were given for consideration, or 
because they were detrimentally relied upon. In fact, as Fuller 
and Perdue (not to mention Aristotle)190 have argued, we are 
more concerned with enforcing promises when the promisor, by 
making the promise, has caused harm to the promisee. Now 
certainly, in this case, the promisee might have trouble with 
some of the doctrinal requirements of promissory estoppel. This 
might not be a winning case because a court might conclude 
that nonenforcement would not be unjust; or perhaps that this 
sort of reliance was not foreseeable by the promisor. But all we 
would have to do is change a few facts (and not in a terribly 
unrealistic way) to bring this hypothetical within the ambit of 
section 90.191 In any event, though the details of this 
hypothetical may make it an inappropriate case for 
enforcement, its structure forces us to confront the fact that 
adequate assurances often involve promises that can be relied 
upon, and that there is no obvious reason why the harm caused 
  
 190 ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 109-14 (J. A. Ackrill & J. O. Urmson 
eds., David Ross trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1998). 
 191 For example, if the builder simply knew that the landowner was not 
planning to live in the house, but to sell it for a profit, the chances for success under 
section 90 would be significantly higher. 
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by such promises should be treated differently under law than 
other promises. 
In this Part, I have shown that if we take seriously the 
promissory character of adequate assurances—if we accept that 
they can be enforceable promises—then we must confront 
practical considerations of the highest order, namely, the 
availability of damages for breach of contract. I have shown the 
practical significance of this issue through the exposition of 
realistic hypotheticals that demonstrate that real-world 
litigants would have a serious financial interest in the conflicts 
I have constructed. Although I do not claim that principles of 
contract law require the adoption of the Independent Damages 
Rule, I have provided a factual and theoretical framework for 
thinking about the question and have given meaningful 
reasons in support of the rule. 
CONCLUSION 
The doctrine of adequate assurances of performance 
has, since its inception, been relegated to the periphery of 
contract law. By highlighting the promissory character of 
adequate assurances, I hope to have convinced readers that the 
doctrine implicates the issues that rest at the very heart of 
contract theory. I have demonstrated that assurances can take 
the form of promises that deserve to be treated by the law as 
enforceable contracts. I have also explored the consequences 
that would follow from such a treatment, and most 
importantly, its effect on damages flowing from the breach of 
the assurance promise.  
If one accepts my basic claim about the enforceability of 
these promises, then the difficult questions of duration and 
damages addressed in this article ought to provoke more 
attention from scholars. The next step in resolving these issues 
involves moving beyond the doctrinal, logical, and functional 
analyses that were the modalities of this article, and engaging 
in a more thoroughgoing theoretical analysis focusing on 
theories of promise and damages. 
EPILOGUE 
The purpose of this article has been to present an 
account of assurances that takes their promissory character 
seriously. A significant implication of such a treatment is that 
it forces us to consider the impact on damages if the promise of 
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the assurances is breached. Specifically, if the assurance is 
treated as a promise giving rise to a contract, then logically, 
the breach of that promise would give rise to damages 
independent of those available under the original contract. 
Similarly, we have seen that treating the assurance promise as 
a contract would lead us to think that the promise would 
remain enforceable even after the original contract was no 
longer in force. We have marshaled a variety of arguments—
pro and con—on the questions of duration and damages, but in 
each case, we were working without the benefit of a clear legal 
rule that could neatly resolve these issues.  
We have, however, hinted at the existence of such a 
simple means of resolution. Although the courts have not 
addressed the question, one can easily imagine a court treating 
the promise of the assurance as a modification of the original 
contract. Such a maneuver would obviate (or at least greatly 
simplify) the inquiry into whether the breach of the assurance 
promise could give rise to damages different from those 
available for breach of the underlying contract, or how long the 
assurance promise was to remain in effect. If the courts 
categorically treated assurances as modifications, then there 
would be no question of damages under a separate contract and 
no confusion over duration. 
But it is not clear that the courts would disfavor 
treating the promise of the assurance as a distinct promise, one 
with its own integrity and one whose breach could give rise to 
damages that might not be available under the initial contract. 
This line of inquiry requires consideration of a slightly modified 
question; namely, which new promises between parties to a 
contract amount to a modification and which amount to a new 
contract? Unfortunately, the law of modification does not 
provide a clear doctrinal framework for answering that 
question. Moreover, there exists an ample scholarly literature 
on modification that completely overlooks this question.192 Yet 
this omission cannot be ascribed to the notion that the question 
is too rarefied or esoteric to merit an applicable legal rule. 
  
 192 See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Contract Modification Under the Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 680 (1982); Thomas J. Miceli, Over a Barrel: 
Contract Modification, Reliance and Bankruptcy, 22 INT’L. REV. L. & ECON. 41 (2002); 
John E. Murray, Jr., The Modification Mysters: Section 2-209 of the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1 (1987); Irma S. Russell, Reinventing the Deal: A Sequential 
Approach to Analyzing Claims for Enforcement of Modified Sales Contracts, 53 FLA. L. 
REV. 49 (2001); Snyder, supra note 121; Richard E. Speidel, Contract Formation and 
Modification Under Revised Article 2, 35 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1305 (1994). 
2010] ADEQUATE ASSURANCES OF PERFORMANCE 215 
Indeed, multiple promises are a very common occurrence 
between contracting parties. Consider the following example. 
Buyer and seller have a contract under which buyer 
agrees to purchase all of its requirements of soda from the 
seller, with a minimum quantity of one thousand cases of soda 
per month for a year. Buyer and seller agree that the varieties 
of soda will be determined at the time of the placement of each 
purchase order, once a week, at seller’s posted wholesale price. 
In the middle of the contract, seller introduces a new item to its 
product lineup: iced tea. If the parties agree that buyer will 
start purchasing iced tea, have they made a new contract or 
modified their original agreement?  
As this hypothetical suggests, there is nothing 
exceptional about parties to an executory contract making new 
promises. There are several ways the parties might address 
these new promises that bear on the question at hand. They 
might document the new promise with a new form agreement, 
indicating a subjective intention that the new promise 
constitutes a new contract. They might explicitly indicate their 
intention that the new promise acts as a modification of their 
original agreement. Parties with ongoing relationships also 
commonly execute master contracts which contemplate new 
undertakings and provide for easy documentation, such as 
purchase orders, for any subsequent orders. Alternatively, the 
parties might not give any thought whatsoever to the 
classification of the new promise as a modification or separate 
contract.  
The Restatement offers some insight into the question, 
but it does not necessarily answer our question. A somewhat 
obscure Comment to section 231 of the Second Restatement 
provides some doctrinal guidance.  
When each party gives more than one promise, or gives some 
performance in addition to a promise, it may not be clear whether 
there is a single exchange of promises resulting in a single contract 
or separate exchanges resulting in separate contracts. If every 
promise by one party is at least part of the consideration for every 
promise by the other party, there is a single exchange in which all of 
the promises on each side are exchanged for all of those on the other 
side. . . . The form of the agreement is not controlling, and the actual 
bargain of the parties is not to be determined merely by reference to 
such criteria as whether separate performances are made the subject 
of a single promise or of separate promises, whether separate 
promises are contained in a single writing or in separate writings, or 
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whether the understanding of the parties is entirely written or oral 
or is partly written and partly oral.193 
While, on first reading, this text seems to offer the 
promise of some guidance for our question, this impression 
largely dissolves when one grasps the actual purpose of this 
complex passage. The purpose of this rule is to resolve disputes 
over whether two contracts, executed essentially 
simultaneously, but in separate documents, ought to be treated 
as a single contract or as two contracts. While the factual 
scenario contemplated by the rule is distinct from the one 
under consideration in this article, it is conceptually related, 
and therefore worthy of some further discussion.  
Consider the following scenario and commentary: X 
owns a bowling alley and would like to sell it, but wishes to 
continue working after he sells his business. He agrees to sell 
the business to Y for an amount that reflects the fair value of 
the business. The two parties execute an agreement of sale at a 
lawyer’s office, and at the same time execute another written 
agreement under which X will work for Y as a manager for 
$75,000 per year. Three weeks later and before the sale 
transaction closes, Y unjustifiably fires X. May X refuse to 
complete the sale of the business to Y? As Professor John 
Murray’s treatise explains, 
The determination of whether there is one contract or two contracts 
is highly significant. If there are two contracts, Y has breached the 
employment contract and X has breached the sales contract. 
However, if there is only one contract, Y has breached the single 
contract and X has not breached since X was excused from any 
further performance of his duties to complete the transfer of the 
business upon the breach of duty by Y.194 
The test offered by the Restatement requires a court to focus on 
the intent of the parties, rather than the form of the 
agreement.195  
So we have here a legal rule that to some degree 
addresses the question of whether a subsequent promise 
constitutes a separate contract. But we also must recognize 
that the rule is meant to apply to separate promises that were 
made at the time of formation. Still, the consequence of the 
classification (one contract or two) affects the very question 
  
 193 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 231 cmt. d (1981). 
 194 JOHN EDWARD MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS § 105, at 659 (4th ed. 2001). 
 195 Id. 
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about damages that is fundamental to the problem of 
assurances we are exploring in this article. Regrettably, by 
making the parties’ intent the key to resolving the question, 
the Restatement effectively abstains from providing any 
meaningful guidance that might be of use in distinguishing a 
modification from a new contract.  
Contract law has other minor doctrines that, when 
viewed at a distance, appear promisingly to address issues 
analogous to ours. Among these are accord and satisfaction, 
novation, and the doctrine of substituted contracts. Yet these 
too prove to be dead ends. In the absence of a clear, 
comprehensive method of distinguishing between modifications 
and new contracts, a court interested in classifying assurance 
promises as modifications would be left to resort either to an 
intention-of-the-parties analysis, or a functional analysis of the 
sort we engaged in in Parts IV and V. 
